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Introduction 
On October 1, 2010, news broke of a study in which U.S. doctors 
intentionally infected Guatemalans with gonorrhea, cancroid, and syphilis 
to study new methods of prevention.1  For the past sixty years, the events of 
the study were buried in files and forgotten.2  By chance, Professor Susan 
Reverby of Wellesley College discovered the unpublished notes and 
presented the first discussion of the study in her article, “Normal Exposure” 
and Inoculation Syphilis:  A PHS “Tuskegee” Doctor in Guatemala, 1946–
48.3 
As is now known, from 1946–48, the Venereal Disease Research 
Laboratory of the U.S. Public Health Service (PHS), the Pan American 
Sanitary Bureau (PASB), and the Guatemalan government spearheaded a 
study4 that intentionally infected and tested Guatemalan prisoners, asylum 
inmates, soldiers, and orphaned children.5  The research team, led by Dr. 
John C. Cutler, exposed Guatemalans to syphilis “through the use of 
infectious prostitutes or directly through [an] inoculum made from tissue of 
human and animal syphilitic gummas and chancres,”6 and then treated the 
                                                                                                                 
 1. U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., FACT SHEET ON THE 1946-1948 U.S. 
PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED DISEASES (STD) INOCULATION STUDY 1 
(2010) [hereinafter FACT SHEET], available at http://www.hhs.gov/1946inoculationstudy/ 
1946_std_inoculations_factsheet-eng.pdf (stating the purpose of the study was “to look for 
new ways to prevent STDs, including gonorrhea, cancroid, and syphilis”). 
 2. See Susan M. Reverby, “Normal Exposure” and Inoculation Syphilis:  A PHS 
“Tuskegee” Doctor in Guatemala, 1946–48, 23 J. POL’Y HIST. 6, 20 (“The extraordinary 
efforts [Dr. Cutler] had made to produce disease and understand various kinds of 
prophylaxis were buried in the files.”).  
 3. See The CNN Wire Staff, U.S. Apologizes for Infecting Guatemalans with STDs in 
the 1940s, CNN, Oct. 1, 2010, http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/americas/ 
10/01/us.guatemala.apology/index.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2012) (reporting the origins of 
the Guatemala study and the revelation of the study due to Professor Reverby’s efforts) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 4. See CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, Report on Findings from the 
U.S. Public Health Service Sexually Transmitted Disease Inoculation Study of 1946–1948, 
Based on Review of Archived Papers of John Cutler, MD, at the University of Pittsburgh 4 
(2010),  http://www.hhs.gov/1946inoculationstudy/cdc_rept-std_inoc_study.html (last 
visited Apr. 2, 2012) (stating the parties involved in the research study) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 5. See Reverby, supra note 2, at 12 (stating the researchers chose, as subjects, “the 
usual quartet of the available and contained:  prisoners in a national penitentiary, inmates in 
Guatemala’s only mental hospital, children in the national orphanage, and soldiers in a 
barracks in the capital”). 
 6. Id. at 9. 
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Guatemalans with penicillin.7  Although the researchers acknowledged they 
could not use such methods in the United States,8 they experimented in 
secrecy and did not seek consent from human subjects.9 
Shortly following news of the Guatemala study, the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) responded:  “Such abuses could not 
occur today in research funded or conducted by the U.S. government.  A 
series of safeguards established over the past [forty] years provide 
protection for human participants, whether in the United States or overseas, 
in medical research from these types of abuses.”10  In January, 2011, 
President Obama asked the Presidential Commission for the Study of 
Bioethical Issues (PCSBI) to reexamine the current state of domestic and 
international ethics to ensure nothing similar to the Guatemala study 
happens again.11  Not only is the PCSBI conducting a thorough examination 
of whether existing standards and practices are adequate for international 
clinical trials, but it is also conducting a retrospective examination of the 
Guatemala study and its context.12  As a result, the United States’ current 
protections for human subjects are unlikely to continue as the PCSBI 
focuses on improving such protections and creating a global standard. 
                                                                                                                 
 7. See id. (“After learning what they could from each exposure that caused actual 
infection (and not all did), they used penicillin, expecting, if not always, curing the 
infections.”) (citations omitted). 
 8. See id. at 18–19 (stating that “[e]veryone involved with these studies seemed to 
know they were treading on complicated ethical grounds” and that some of those involved 
acknowledged such experiments could not be done in the United States). 
 9. See id. at 19 (discussing the lack of informed consent given by the research 
subjects and how the researchers suppressed information due to concern “about the 
possibility of having anything said about [the] program that would adversely affect its 
continuation”) (quotations omitted). 
 10. FACT SHEET, supra note 1, at 1. 
 11. See Memorandum on Review of Human Subjects Protection, 2010 DAILY COMP. 
PRES. DOC. 1015 (Nov. 24, 2010), http://origin.www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-
201001015/pdf/DCPD-201001015.pdf (asking the Commission “to convene a panel to 
conduct, beginning in January 2011, a thorough review of human subjects protection to 
determine if federal regulations and international standards adequately guard the health and 
well-being of participants in scientific studies supported by the Federal Government”). 
 12. See Amy Gutmann, Commissioner Chair of the Presidential Commission for the 
Study of Bioethical Issues, Opening Remarks and Executive Director's Report, THE 
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES (Mar. 1, 2011), 
http://www.tvworldwide.com/events/bioethics/110228/default.cfm?id=13284&type=flv& 
test=0&live=0 (last visited Apr. 2, 2012) (discussing the adequacy of standards and practices 
for international clinical trials) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights 
and Social Justice). 
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Through the PCSBI, the ethics of using human subjects has come to 
the foreground of the U.S. government’s attention.  Even in recent history, 
safeguards codified in U.S. federal regulations and found in other 
international sources have been both inadequate and not rigorously 
enforced.13  In response to both contemporary experiments involving 
human subjects and the interest of the PCSBI in improving human 
protection standards, this Note addresses whether modern legal standards 
adequately compel researchers to obtain informed consent and contrasts the 
Guatemala study with modern human subject studies.  In Part I, the details 
of the Guatemala study, the ethical and legal standards of the time, and the 
medical researchers’ compliance with those standards are examined.  Part II 
analyzes modern informed consent, draws parallels between the Guatemala 
study and modern research methods, and discusses flaws in modern 
informed consent standards and practices.  Finally, Part III advocates for 
improving U.S. protections by enacting the Research Participants Protection 
Modernization Act of 2011. 
I.  The Guatemala Study 
The U.S. government responded to news of the Guatemala study with 
a statement expressing regret, outrage, and a commitment to high ethical 
standards.14  Nevertheless, the U.S. public expressed fear that the study 
could reignite minorities’ suspicion of medical research,15 concerns that 
                                                                                                                 
 13. See infra Part II.D (discussing modern informed consent, lack of compliance, and 
private pharmaceutical companies’ continued exploitation of human subjects despite FDA 
regulations and international guidelines); see also John Daniels, U.S. Funded AIDS Research 
in Haiti:  Does Geography Dictate How Closely the United States Government Scrutinizes 
Human Research Testing?, 11 Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. 203, 203 (2000) (discussing that U.S. 
regulated research studies often are not reviewed adequately enough to ensure researchers 
are complying with ethical standards, such as informed consent). 
 14. See Hillary Rodham Clinton, U.S. Sec’y of State, and Kathleen Sebelius, U.S. 
Sec’y of Health and Human Services, Joint Statement by Secretaries Clinton and Sebelius on 
a 1948–1948 Study (Oct. 1, 2010), available at http://www.state.gov/ 
secretary/rm/2010/10/148464.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2012) (apologizing for the Guatemala 
study and expressing regret) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights 
and Social Justice); see also the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Read-out of the 
President’s Call with Guatemalan President Colom (Oct. 1, 2010), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/10/01/read-out-presidents-call-with-
guatemalan-president-colom (last visited Apr. 2, 2012) (summarizing the private telephone 
conversation between President Obama and President Colom in which President Obama 
communicated regret) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and 
Social Justice). 
 15. See Arthur Caplan, Horrific Medical Tests of Past Raise Concerns for Today:  As 
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using human subjects in prisons or poor communities warrants caution,16 
and worries that the United States still engages in egregious research with 
human participants.17  These misgivings demonstrate that the Guatemala 
study provides a helpful reference point against which to compare current 
studies and ethics. 
A.  Inception 
The Guatemala study was established to test the effectiveness of 
treating syphilis with penicillin and to discover the mechanism that 
transmitted syphilis.18  Gonorrhea and cancroid studies also occurred.19  The 
United States received the brunt of public attention,20 but it did not control 
                                                                                                                 
More Research Moves Outside U.S., Are We Still Exploiting the Poor?, MSN TODAY 
HEALTH, Oct. 1, 2010, http://today.msnbc.msn.com/id/39463624/ns/today-today_health (last 
visited Apr. 2, 2012) (stating that “[t]rust in medical research remains tenuous because of 
what was done to great-grandparents and friends” of participants in the Tuskegee study) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 16. See Amy Goodman, From Tuskegee to Guatemala, via Nuremburg, THE CAPITAL 
TIMES, Oct. 7, 2010, http://host.madison.com/ct/news/opinion/column/article_9d6531a7-
db5d-5854-a858-4ddfcea25a16.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2012) (stating that “efforts are 
being made to loosen restrictions” that protect subjects from abusive practices such as those 
in the Guatemala study, so “[w]e need to ask what ‘informed consent’ means inside a prison, 
or in a poor community when money is used as an incentive to ‘volunteer’”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 17. See Richard S. Saver, Medical Research Regulation After More Than Twenty-Five 
Years:  Old Problems, New Challenges, and Regulatory Imbalance, 19 ANN. HEALTH L. 223, 
227 (2010) (“Opinion polls suggest the public’s confidence in the research [oversight] 
system has been eroding, a trend, no doubt fueled by intense media coverage of subject 
deaths at leading academic medical centers, regardless of how anomalous such episodes may 
be.”); see also Stephen Soldz, Guatemalan Research Horrors and U.S. Hipocracy:  CIA 
Unethical Research Ignored, ZNET, Oct. 4, 2010, http://www.zcommunications.org/ 
guatemalan-research-horrors-and-us-hypocrisy-by-stephen-soldz (last visited Apr. 2, 2012) 
(“According to top US officials, abusing people in the name of research without their 
permission is awful, truly awful . . . .  However, US officials have so far been totally silent 
about horrific, unethical research conducted by US government researchers [as part of the 
CIA] within the last decade.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights 
and Social Justice). 
 18. See CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, supra note 4 at 4 (stating that 
“the primary purpose of the studies was to develop human models of transmission of 
Treponema pallidum—the bacteria that causes syphilis—by sexual transmission and  . . . 
inoculation”). 
 19. See id. at 2–3 (describing that in addition to syphilis the researchers also studied 
gonorrhea and chancroid). 
 20. See supra notes 15–17 and accompanying text (discussing the American public’s 
reaction to news of the Guatemala study). 
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the research directly.21  Responsibility was channeled through the Pan 
American Sanitary Bureau (PASB).22  The PASB enlisted the aid of 
Guatemala and the United States and officially sponsored the Guatemala 
study as part of its commitment to “maintaining and improving the health of 
all the people of the [twenty-one] American publics and also to preventing 
the occurrence and spread of transmissible diseases in international 
commerce.”23  However, even though it was a separate entity from the 
PASB, the U.S. Public Health Service (PHS) exerted substantial control of 
the study behind the scenes.24 
Conveniently for the United States and the PASB, an ideal testing site 
was created by the interest of a leader in Guatemala’s health industry, 
influence from the United States, and Guatemala’s demographics.  The 
selection of Guatemala for the research site was based largely on the 
suggestion of Dr. Juan Funes, chief of the Venereal Disease Control 
Division of the Guatemalan Sanidad Publica.25  Like other Latin American 
countries that enlisted the aid of the PHS,26 Guatemala was seeking to build 
a health infrastructure, and Dr. Funes’ familiarity with the PHS facilitated 
the relationship.27  The United States wielded enormous economic28 and 
political29 pressure during this time, which likely encouraged the 
                                                                                                                 
 21. See CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, supra note 4, at 1 (explaining 
that the PHS and the PASB “collaborated with several government agencies in Guatemala 
on U.S. National Institutes of Health-funded studies involving deliberate exposure of human 
subjects with bacteria that cause sexually transmitted diseases”). 
 22. See id. at 5 (stating that the PASB received a grant from the United States to 
conduct the Guatemala study with the aid of U.S. personnel and Guatemalan cooperation). 
 23. Bolivar J. Lloyd, The Pan American Sanitary Bureau, 20 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH & 
NATION’S HEALTH 925 (1930), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/ 
pmc/articles/PMC1556056/pdf/amjphnation00625-0021.pdf.  
 24. See Reverby, supra note 2, at 11 (stating that “one historian has argued the Pan 
American Sanitary Bureau ‘functioned until the late 1930s…as a virtual branch of the 
[PHS]’”) (citing MARCOS CUETO, MISSIONARIES OF SCIENCE:  THE ROCKEFELLER 
FOUNDATION AND LATIN AMERICA xiii (Bloomington 1994)). 
 25. See CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, supra note 4, at 5 (stating that 
Dr. Funes proposed that the United States should conduct the research in Guatemala). 
 26. See Reverby, supra note 2, at 11 (discussing the PHS’s involvement in developing 
public health infrastructure in Latin America).  
 27. See Reverby, supra note 2, at 9 (“The PHS training of Dr. Juan Funes, 
Guatemala’s leading venereal disease public health official, made the forging of close 
cooperation easier and the building of a public health infrastructure important.”). 
 28. See id. (“The United Fruit Company [, a U.S. company,] owned and controlled 
much of Guatemala, the quintessential ‘banana republic,’ in the first half of the twentieth 
century.”). 
 29. See id. (“Between 1944 and the U.S.-led CIA coup of the elected government in 
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Guatemalan government’s collaboration.  Moreover, Guatemala was an 
attractive site because syphilis was not yet prevalent among Guatemalans, 
supplying a fresh demographic of subjects.30  Contraction of the diseases 
could be authentic also because Guatemalan law permitted prostitutes to 
visit male prisoners.31 
Given the benefits of testing in Guatemala, the PASB received funding 
from the PHS.32  When the PASB allocated responsibilities, it decided the 
U.S. Venereal Disease Research Laboratory would head the research and 
provide medical personnel while the Guatemalan government would 
facilitate training and afford cooperation with government entities.33  
Although deception and secrecy later characterized this study,34 the 
scientific community initially regarded the study favorably, and even the 
U.S. Surgeon General was “keenly interested.”35 
B.  Testing Procedures 
Respected scientists had high expectations for the Guatemala study 
because the U.S. researchers examined “syphilization” (human response to 
fresh infection) and methods of prevention after sexual exposure.36  Though 
animal experimentation had provided insight, the researchers wanted to 
study syphilization via “normal exposure.”37  Normal exposure entailed 
                                                                                                                 
1954, efforts were made at labor protection laws, land reform, and democratic elections.”). 
 30. See id. at 11 (“Unlike Alabama, where the PHS expected to find a large number of 
subjects with the late latent stage of the disease already, Guatemala offered subjects who did 
not yet have syphilis.”). 
 31. See CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, supra note 4, at 5–6 (stating that 
“prostitution was legalized to the extent that prostitutes were allowed to pay regular visits to 
men in penal institutions”) (citations omitted). 
 32. See id. (stating that “[a] research grant was made by the USPHS Division of 
Research Grants,” the unit in charge of United States National Institute of Health extramural 
funding, to the PASB). 
 33. See CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, supra note 4, at 6 (describing 
the responsibilities that the VRDL and the Guatemalan government assumed). 
 34. See Reverby, supra note 2, at 16 (stating that “[d]eception was central” to the 
Guatemala study). 
 35. See CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, supra note 4, at 6 (listing 
several eminent scientific researchers interested in the study before the study commenced). 
 36. See id. at 12 (“Cutler and Funes had two goals.  One was to use what was called 
‘syphilization’ to test the human response to ‘fresh infective material to enhance body 
response to disease  . . . [to understand] superinfection and reinfection.’  The second goal 
was to find ways to prevent the disease immediately after exposure.”) (citations omitted). 
 37. See id. (“Animal experimentation, especially with rabbits, was long a mainstay in 
twentieth-century syphilis research, but it could not answer these pressing research 
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male prisoners receiving visits by prostitutes who were infected, either 
naturally or artificially.38  The researchers encountered a problem, however.  
Even if promised medication, the inmates resisted testing because they 
believed the frequent samples left them weakened.39  What is more, the 
research did not progress as planned because either many men did not 
contract syphilis40 or tested positive before normal exposure.41  
Consequently, the group of uninfected subjects grew too small to provide 
an adequate sample, and the researchers had to abandon testing prisoners.42 
After fruitless results with prison inmates and inconclusive blood tests 
on naturally infected children,43 the researchers turned to patients in the 
National Mental Health Hospital to determine whether penicillin could be a 
prophylaxis, not just a cure.44  Though consent was given, it came from the 
hospital, not individual patients.45  The hospital bartered consent for items 
such as anticonvulsant drugs and cutlery,46 and qualifying patients47 were 
                                                                                                                 
questions.  The PHS researchers wanted to do a study where they knew there would be a 
good deal of what they politely called ‘normal exposure’ to the disease in humans.”).  
 38. See id. (stating that men were infected by “prostitutes who tested positive for 
either syphilis or gonorrhea” or by “uninfected prostitutes [who] had inoculums of the 
diseases placed on their cervixes”).  Interestingly, regardless of which prostitute was 
employed, U.S. taxpayers paid the prostitutes via the PHS grant.  Id. 
 39. See Reverby, supra note 2, at 13 (“‘[T]he inmates were for the most part 
uneducated and superstitious.  Most of them believed they were being weakened’ by the 
frequent blood withdrawals.  Even though penicillin and iron pills were promised, ‘in their 
minds there was no connection between the loss of a large tube of blood and possible 
benefits of a small pill.’”). 
 40. See id. (“Not enough of the sexually well-serviced men   . . . even when plied with 
alcohol, seemed to be getting syphilis.”) (citations omitted). 
 41. See id. (“The next problem the researchers ran into regarded the blood tests:  too 
many positives even before more ‘normal exposure’ occurred.”). 
 42. See id. (“Since [the researchers] needed men who either had never had the disease 
or had already been cured of the disease for their studies, they discovered their pool was too 
small for statistical significance to be possible.”). 
 43. See Reverby, supra note 2, at 13. Due to the difficulties encountered in prisons, the 
researchers studied the effectiveness of the blood tests on children between the ages of six 
and sixteen in the National Orphanage.  Id.  Notably, the researchers did not infect children 
with syphilis.  Id. at 13–14.  However, the researchers had difficulty ascertaining why 
eighty-nine children who had no clinical signs of syphilis yielded positive test results, so the 
researchers abandoned testing this particular population.   
 44. See CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, supra note 4, at 8–9 (discussing 
the switch to studies asylum inmates rather than prisoners) (citations omitted).  
 45. See Reverby, supra note 2, at 14 (“As in Tuskegee and throughout the global 
South in these years, the cooperation was sought with the institution, not with the subject-
inmates or their families.”). 
 46. See id. at 14 (stating the researchers found “the best way to gain that cooperation 
was by offering supplies  . . . [such as] anti-convulsant drugs   . . .  a refrigerator for 
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bribed to participate with cigarettes.48  In order to expose a male patient to 
the inoculum, a doctor abraded the subject’s penis and dripped “syphilitic 
emulsion” onto a cotton dressing for “at least an hour, sometimes two.”49  
Due to cultural beliefs about men viewing women’s bodies,50 women 
received the inoculum on their forearms, faces, or mouths.51 
In all the experiments, the records indicate that the human subjects 
gave no consent.52  The U.S. Venereal Research Disease Laboratory 
became uncomfortable with using asylum patients as subjects.53  So, when 
the study became too expensive, “the project in Guatemala became difficult 
to justify.”54  As a result, the United States’ direct involvement concluded 
when the study was terminated in 1948.  Two local physicians and the 
PASB continued to observe patients as late as 1953.55  Questionable ethics 
                                                                                                                 
biologicals, a motion picture projector that supplied the sole recreation for the inmates, metal 
cups, plates and forks to supplement the completely inadequate supply available”) (citations 
omitted). 
 47. See CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, supra note 4, at 10 (stating 
subjects were selected “based on baseline serologic findings and a history of syphilis, 
perceived cooperativity, and the likelihood that the subject would not be released” before the 
study concluded). 
 48. See Reverby, supra note 2, at 14 (“Individual subjects were offered cigarettes:  an 
entire packet for inoculation, blood draws, or spinal taps, and a single cigarette for ‘clinical 
observation.’”) (citations omitted). 
 49. Id. at 15 (“[A] doctor held the subject’s penis, pulled back the foreskin, abraded 
the penis slightly just short of drawing blood by scraping the skin with a hypodermic needle, 
introduced a cotton pledget (or small dressing), and dripped drops of the syphilitic emulsion 
onto the pad and through it to the roughed skin on the man’s penis for at least an hour, 
sometimes two.”). 
 50. See id. at 15 (stating that there were “local prejudices against male viewing of the 
body, even by physicians” (quotations omitted)). 
 51. See id. (stating that “the inoculum was inserted after needles were used to abrade 
the women’s forearms, face or mouth”). 
 52. See Reverby, supra note 2, at 21 (stating that the researchers “were morally 
capable of infecting people with syphilis, for their faith in their cause allowed them to infect 
people with this dreadful disease without their consent or even knowledge— at least when 
those people lacked power and white skin”). 
 53. See id. at 19 (stating that U.S. authorities “seemed less concerned with the 
prostitute transmission studies taking place in the prison, but seemed more squeamish about 
the politics and morality of the inoculation studies taking place in the mental hospital”) 
(citations omitted).   
 54. Reverby, supra note 2, at 17. 
 55. See CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, supra note 4, at 22 (“Although 
syphilis serologic results and follow-up clinical observations were recorded on some 
subjects until 1953, there is no record of what activities occurred after patient follow-up was 
taken over by PASB and the two local physicians, nor whether further human inoculation 
studies were performed . . . .”). 
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continued, however, because “while the majority of exposed and infected 
subjects appear[ed] to have eventually been prescribed doses of penicillin, 
treatment was routinely delayed for several months after exposure and a 
substantial number of subjects were never treated.”56 
C.  Informed Consent 
Though it may not be obvious from the behavior in the Guatemala 
study, both the American public and the medical profession were well-
aware of unethical experiments.57  Criticism was voiced in the United States 
as early as 1833, when U.S. surgeon William Beaumont announced that 
doctors ought to secure “free consent” from patients before procedures.58  
In fact, surgeons and hospital administrators sought written consent from 
patients in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries.59 
Despite early advocacy for patient rights, attitudes shifted with the 
onset of World Wars I and II when scientific research became “one 
essential key to our security as a nation, to our better health, to more jobs, 
to high standard of living, and to our cultural progress.”60  The medical 
profession itself did not advocate for patient rights but successfully 
“undertook great efforts . . . to block legal initiatives aimed at the restriction 
of experiments on humans.”61  The U.S. government intervened only when 
                                                                                                                 
 56. Id. at 21. 
 57. See WOLFGANG WEYERS, THE ABUSE OF MAN:  AN ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF 
DUBIOUS MEDICAL EXPERIMENTATION 174 (Ardor Scribendi, Ltd. 2003) (“[P]rofound respect 
for the rights of individuals inherent in the Constitution of the United States of America 
[initially] lowered the threshold for tolerance for unconscionable treatment of patients.”). 
 58. See id. (“Nowhere, however, was criticism of human experimentation as 
vociferous as in the United States  . . .  As early as 1833, an American surgeon, William 
Beaumont, called for the procurement of 'free consent’ of patients prior to having any 
medical experiment performed on them.”) (citing THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBERG 
CODE:  HUMAN RIGHTS IN HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION 121–44 (George J. Annas & Michael 
A. Grodin eds., New York, Oxford University Press 1992)). 
 59. See id. at 178 (“In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the growing 
number of lawsuits concerning unauthorized surgical procedures prompted surgeons and 
hospital administrators to introduce forms for written consent.”). 
 60. Id. (citing FADEN RR ET AL., FINAL REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON 
HUMAN RADIATION EXPERIMENTS 10 (1995)). 
 61. WEYERS, supra note 57, at 214; see also U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN 
SERVS., INFORMATION ON PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS IN RESEARCH FUNDED OR 
REGULATED BY U.S. GOVERNMENT:  HOW TODAY’S  RULES PROHIBIT ETHICAL ABUSES IN 
HUMAN SUBJECTS RESEARCH 1 (2010) [hereinafter INFORMATION ON PROTECTION], available 
at http://www.hhs.gov/1946inoculationstudy/information_on_protection_of_human_sub 
jects_in_research.pdf (“There was tremendous growth in research around World War II.  
Human subjects research entered what some scholars have described as an ‘unashamedly 
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it sensed “serious adverse reactions from the public”62 and greatly enlarged 
its spending on medical research during this period.63  As a result, when the 
Guatemala study occurred in the late 1940s, the U.S. government both 
broadly funded and routinely ignored active human experimentation. 
In light of the flexible approach to ethics adopted by medical 
researchers and the financial endorsement by the U.S. government, one 
could speculate that the researchers knew their actions could be deemed 
morally unethical, but they were unsure of legal standards.64  According to 
the Department of Health and Human Services, no specific codes, laws, or 
regulations governed the ethics of human experimentation during that time 
period.65  While no binding law oversaw experimentation in an international 
setting, U.S. law did control research conducted in the United States.  
Consequently, it was likely that the U.S. research team in Guatemala was 
aware of legal and ethical standards. 
1.  U.S. Legislation & Ethical Codes 
At the time of the Guatemala study, the United States had no 
legislation that required medical researchers to obtain informed consent.66  
The American public, however, had expressed interest in regulating animal 
and human research.67  Between 1900 and 1924, state legislatures discussed 
                                                                                                                 
utilitarian phase.’”). 
 62. Id. (stating that consent was only sought when “researchers and administrators of 
the Committee of Medical Research sensed the possibility of serious adverse reaction from 
the public”). 
 63. See id. at 174 (“In 1945, the U.S. government spent approximately $700,000 on 
medical research.  Ten years later, the total had climbed to $36 million . . . .”). 
 64. See Reverby, supra note 2, at 19 (“Malaria specialist G. Robert Coatney, who had 
done prison malaria studies, visited the project in February 1947.  In reporting to Cutler after 
he returned to the States, he explained that he had brought Surgeon General Thomas Parran 
up to date and that with a merry twinkle [that] came into his eye  . . . [he] said, 'You know, 
we couldn’t do such an experiment in this country.’”) (quotations omitted) (citations 
omitted). 
 65. See INFORMATION ON PROTECTION, supra note 61, at 1 (“Prior to World War II 
there were no specific codes of ethics, laws, or regulations governing the conduct of human 
subjects research.”). 
 66. See Jennifer J. Couture, Note, The Changes in Informed Consent in Experimental 
Procedures:  The Evolution of a Concept, 1 J. OF HEALTH & BIOMED. L. 125, 134 (2004) 
(stating that since the turn of the century, the FDA had regulations in place to protect the 
public from harmful experimental or untested treatments; however, these regulations largely 
focused on protecting consumers from misbranded or adulterated food, drugs, and 
cosmetics). 
 67. See WEYERS, supra note 57, at 195–202 (discussing legislation regulating animal 
vivisection and other legislation opposing experimentation on humans supported by public 
436 18 WASH. & LEE J.C.R. & SOC. JUST. 425 (2012) 
bills that restricted experimentation on humans and animals, though none 
passed successfully.68  The first federal bill regarding human 
experimentation, Senate Bill 3424, was introduced by Senator Gallinger of 
New Hampshire in 1900.69  The bill proposed regulating experiments in the 
District of Columbia by requiring prior disclosure of research methods, 
mandating written consent from human subjects,70 and prohibiting 
experimentation upon vulnerable people.71  Both the medical profession and 
Congress rejected the bill.72  Indeed, the president of the American Medical 
Association (AMA) considered Senate Bill 3424 unnecessary because 
experiments using human subjects were “rare.”73  Remarkably, human 
subject research, including vivisection (experimental surgery on a living 
organism), occurred across the country at this time.74 
No legislation governed human subject research, and the effect of 
William Beaumont’s ethics code and others proposed at this time were 
“practically nil.”75  The AMA, however, had addressed the issue of ethics 
                                                                                                                 
groups). 
 68. See id. at 202 (discussing that proposed legislation in Illinois, Pennsylvania, and 
other state legislatures were considering regulating human and animal experimentation) 
(citations omitted). 
 69. See id. at 201 (“Senator Gallinger introduced a proposal for the regulation of 
experiments on humans in the District of Columbia.”). 
 70. See id. (stating that “Senate Bill 3424 required prior disclosure of ‘the objects and 
methods of the proposed experiment’ to Commissioners of the District, who could then issue 
a specific license for performance of the experiment” that had to include the witnessed and 
notarized written permission of test subjects) (citing S.E. LEDERER, SUBJECTED TO SCIENCE:  
HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION IN AMERICA BEFORE THE SECOND WORLD WAR 143–46 (1997)). 
 71. See id. (stating that a subject had to be at least twenty years old and “in full and 
complete possession of all his or her reasoning faculties” and experiments involving 
children, “women during and for one year after pregnancy,” and “any aged, infirm, epileptic, 
insane, or feeble-minded person were prohibited”) (citing S.E. LEDERER, SUBJECTED TO 
SCIENCE:  HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION IN AMERICA BEFORE THE SECOND WORLD WAR 143–46 
(1997)). 
 72. See id. at 202 (“The proposed legislation was rejected out of hand, and harshly, by 
the medical profession  . . .  [And] Gallinger’s bill was defeated [by Congress], as was a new 
version of it that he introduced in 1902.”). 
 73. See id. (stating that the medical profession and Congress rejected the bill because 
“experiments in humans were so rare that a special act of Congress was not needed to 
control them”). 
 74. See id. at 195–210 (describing experiments such as human and animal vivisection 
or exposing healthy children to diseases that inspired the public to call for regulation) 
(citations omitted). 
 75. See WEYERS, supra note 57, at 43–44  (“[Beaumont’s proposal] and other ethical 
codes for experiments on humans were proposed in the early 1830s, a time when systematic 
medical experiments had just begun.  The impact of those proposals, however, were 
practically nil.”). 
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generally.76  In 1847, nearly a hundred years before the Guatemala study, 
the AMA issued The Principles of Medical Ethics77 to outline physicians’ 
obligations.78  Physicians were to treat patients with “attention and 
humanity.”79  But, it also warned physicians “to avoid all things which have 
a tendency to discourage the patient and to depress his spirits” because 
physicians ought to be “a minister of hope and comfort.”80  These 
conflicting messages suggest that informed consent may not have been a 
priority if it interfered with medical results or good spirits.81  However, 
after the Nuremberg trials, when human experimentation received more 
international outrage, the AMA issued a clearer statement:82 
In order to conform to the ethics of the American Medical Association, 
three requirements must be satisfied:  (1) the voluntary consent of the 
person on whom the experiment is to be performed; (2) the danger of 
each experiment must be previously investigated by animal 
experimentation; and (3) the experiment must be performed under 
proper medical protection and management.83 
Despite this step towards more protective guidelines, the AMA’s 
principles still lacked specific provisions dealing with consent that was not 
only voluntary, but also informed and protecting of vulnerable people.84  As 
                                                                                                                 
 76. See American Medical Association House of Delegates, Minutes of New Orleans 
Session:  Principles of Medical Ethics, 1903 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1379, 1379 (stating the 
ethical principles physicians owed). 
 77. See American Medical Association, History of AMA Ethics:  Ethics Timeline:  
1847 to 1940, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-
medical-ethics/history-ama-ethics/ethics-timeline-1847-1940.page (last visited Apr. 2, 2012) 
(stating that in 1847 the “AMA Code of Medical Ethics [was] written and published”) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 78. See American Medical Association House of Delegates, supra note 76, at 1379 
(stating that physicians have duties towards their patients, to each other and the profession at 
large, and the public, and each obligation has an article enumerating the duties). 
 79. See id. at 1379–80 (stating the ethical code to which the AMA recommended 
medical officials adhere). 
 80. Id. at 1379. 
 81. See Douglas Andrew Grimm, Informed Consent for All! No Exceptions, 37 N.M.L. 
REV. 39, 39 (2007) (stating that physicians were cautioned not to disclose all medical truths 
to patients and “the American Medical Association's first code of ethics warned the 
physician ‘to avoid all things which have a tendency to discourage the patient and to depress 
his spirits’”). 
 82. See WEYERS, supra note 57, at 351–52 (stating that the AMA was induced “to 
issue guidelines for experiments on human beings” at the same time as the Nuremberg Code 
was drafted). 
 83. Id. at 631 (emphasis added). 
 84. See id. at 352 (“Compared with earlier regulations  . . . the AMA principles were 
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a result, even ethics codes that self-regulated the medical profession did not 
truly protect human subjects. 
2.  U.S. Case Law 
Though statutory law was scarce and ethics codes were ineffective, a 
small body of case law emerged in the years before the Guatemala study.85  
In 1914, while sitting on the New York Court of Appeals, Justice Benjamin 
Cardozo decided Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hospital.86  The decision 
has “probably [had] the most impact on the doctrine of informed consent.”87  
In Schloendorff, a woman consented to exploratory surgery and explicitly 
withheld consent to surgical removals; the surgeon removed a tumor 
anyway.88  Justice Cardozo found that even though the surgery benefited 
the patient, “[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right 
to determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who 
performs an operation without his patient’s consent, commits an assault, for 
which he is liable in damages.”89  Consequently, Schloendorff established 
that a patient has the right to actively participate in making medical 
choices.90  After Schloendorff, the patient’s right to give or withhold 
consent to medical procedures (particularly surgical operations) was 
celebrated, and courts throughout the United States followed Cardozo’s 
principles.91 
                                                                                                                 
somewhat primitive, lacking provisions for informed consent and the protection of 
particularly vulnerable populations.”). 
 85. See Peter M. Murray, History of Informed Consent, 10 IOWA ORTHOPAEDIC J. 104, 
105 (1990) (describing the history of American case law that has shaped modern informed 
consent). 
 86. Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129–30 (1914), overruled by 
Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656 (1957) (determining that “[e]very human being of adult years 
and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body; and a 
surgeon who performs an operation without his patient’s consent, commits an assault, for 
which he is liable in damages”). 
 87. Murray, supra note 85, at 105. 
 88. See WEYERS, supra note 57, at 178 (“[A] woman consented to an exploratory 
abdominal operation but insisted that no surgical removal be performed.  After her surgeon 
removed a fibroid tumor discovered during the course of the operation, she brought suit 
against the hospital.”). 
 89. Schloendorff, 211 N.Y. at 129–30. 
 90. See id. at 130 (stating that the principle that a patient has a right to give consent “is 
true except in cases of emergency where the patient is unconscious and where it is necessary 
to operate before consent can be obtained”). 
 91. See, e.g., Birnbaum v. Siegler, 76 N.Y.S.2d 173, 174 (N.Y. App. Div. 1948) 
(“Performance of an operation without valid consent previously obtained constitutes an 
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After Schloendorff, a patient may have had the right to consent to 
surgical procedures, but the standards were still very different for 
individuals in mental institutions.  Medical researchers often used these 
populations, who were unable to give legal consent, because researchers 
knew that abuse of “those who lacked advocacy . . . would likely go 
unnoticed.”92  Affirming this attitude, the Supreme Court decided Buck v. 
Bell.93  The Court famously upheld a Virginia law that permitted sexual 
sterilization of intellectually disabled persons without the person’s 
consent.94  Instead of supporting individual patient consent, the Supreme 
Court endorsed the principle that the State’s consent (via a mental 
institution superintendent) was sufficient.95 
Although the Supreme Court established in Buck v. Bell that consent to 
medical procedures need not be sought from asylum patients,96 the Court 
implicitly abandoned this doctrine sixteen years later.  In Skinner v. 
Oklahoma,97 the Court invalidated a statute that forced sterilization of 
                                                                                                                 
assault on the patient, for which the surgeon would be liable.”) (citing Schloendorff v. Soc’y 
of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 130 (1914), overruled by Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656 
(1957)); see also Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121, 122 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (adopting the rule 
that “surgical operation is a technical battery, regardless of its results, and is excusable only 
when there is express or implied consent by the patient; or, stated somewhat differently, the 
surgeon is liable in damages if the operation is unauthorized”) (citing Schloendorff, 211 N.Y. 
at 130); see also Donald v. Swann, 137 So. 178, 180 (Ala. Ct. App. 1931) (adopting the 
“general rule  . . . supported by unquestioned authority” that “every human being of adult 
years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body” so any 
operation performed without consent and over the patient’s protests is an assault and battery) 
(citing Schloendorff, 211 N.Y. at 130). 
 92. See WEYERS, supra note 57, at 174 (“[T]he evidence of intolerance of Americans 
in regard to experiments on humans led scientists to utilize the most vulnerable populations 
[such as prisoners, orphans, and mental patients].”). 
 93. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (finding that “[i]t is better for all the world, 
if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their 
imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind” 
and “the principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is broad enough to cover cutting the 
Fallopian tubes”) (citing Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905)). 
 94.  See id. at 205–07 (finding that a Virginia law that allowed sterilization for the 
health of the patient and the betterment of society was constitutionally sound). 
 95.  See id. at 205 (stating that the statute permitted a superintendent, who is “of 
opinion that it is for the best interests of the patients and of society that an inmate under his 
care should be sexually sterilized  . . . may have the operation performed upon any patient 
afflicted with hereditary forms of insanity, imbecility, [etc.]”). 
 96. See supra notes 93–98 and accompanying text (explaining that the Supreme Court 
upheld a law that allowed superintendents of mental institutions to substitute their consent 
for that of the patients). 
 97.  Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 538 (1942) (finding that an Oklahoma statute 
that permitted sexual sterilization of recidivist criminals who committed crimes of moral 
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recurring criminals.98  The Court found that the statute contravened the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment99 because sexual 
sterilization caused “irreparable injury.”100  Although the Court did not 
directly address a prisoner’s right to grant or withhold consent, the 
emphasis the Court placed on the irreversibility of the injury diminishes the 
notion that the State’s consent may be substituted for a patient’s consent.101  
Hence, Schloendorff suggested that doctors must seek consent from their 
patients or face liability, but whether the government may consent instead 
of an asylum patient or criminal remained less clear.102 
3.  Guatemalan & International Standards 
While the United States had limited legal authority pertaining to 
human subject research, Guatemala and international law had fewer 
sources.  Due to the influence by the military and U.S. economic power, 
Guatemala was known for its “relative freedoms” immediately post-World 
War II.103 
Until 1944, just before the Guatemala study, General Ubico 
administered law without challenge and governed Guatemala with military 
rule104 (militarization of Guatemalan society was interrupted from 1944–54 
                                                                                                                 
turpitude ran afoul of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 98. See id. at 536–37 (stating that a “habitual criminal” was “a person who, having 
been convicted two or more times for crimes ‘amounting to felonies involving moral 
turpitude’” and “[m]achinery is provided for the institution by the Attorney General of a 
proceeding against such a person in the Oklahoma courts for a judgment that such person 
shall be rendered sexually sterile”). 
 99. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No state shall  . . . deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). 
 100.  See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 (“[The statute] runs afoul of the equal protection 
clause, though we give Oklahoma that large deference which the rule of the foregoing cases 
requires . . .  marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of 
the race . . .  any experiment which the State conducts is to his irreparable injury.”). 
 101. See id. (“Any experiment which the State conducts is to his irreparable injury.  He 
is forever deprived of a basic liberty.”). 
 102. See supra notes 86–94 and accompanying text (discussing Schloendorff and the 
essentialness of informed consent to experimental medical procedures). 
 103. Reverby, supra note 2, at 11 (“When the PHS looked to Guatemala for its research 
in the immediate post-World War II years, it came into the country during the period known 
for its relative freedoms.”). 
 104. See HILDE HEY, GROSS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS:  A SEARCH FOR CAUSES:  A 
STUDY OF GUATEMALA AND COSTA RICA 28 (The Hague 1995) (“General Ubico ruled 
Guatemala for fourteen years, between 1931 and 1944; he advanced military rule without 
being challenged.”). 
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due to a coup led by the CIA).105  General Ubico also advanced the interests 
of the United Fruit Company,106 a U.S. entity that “owned and controlled 
much of Guatemala” at that time.107  As a result, the Guatemalan military 
continued to rigidly secure internal law and order during the Guatemalan 
study,108 but the U.S. economic influence also likely incentivized 
cooperation.109  Moreover, with the cooperation of Guatemala’s Ministry of 
Health, the National Army of the Revolution, the National Mental Health 
Hospital, and the Ministry of Justice, no real regulation was imposed on the 
study.110  Instead, the Guatemalan government demanded medical services 
as the price of cooperation.111 
Bolstered by Guatemala’s endorsement, the Pan American Sanitary 
Bureau orchestrated the Guatemala study.112  The PASB enacted The Pan 
American Sanitary Bureau Code in 1924,113 onto which Guatemala signed 
in 1924 and the U.S. Senate ratified in 1925.114  The purpose of the code 
                                                                                                                 
 105. See Reverby, supra note 2, at 11 (stating that the CIA led a coup of the elected 
government in 1954). 
 106. See HEY, supra note 104, at 28 (stating that General “Ubico enhanced the interests 
of foreign companies, particularly the United Fruit Company”). 
 107. Reverby, supra note 2, at 11. 
 108. See HEY, supra note 104, at 28 (discussing the militarization of Guatemalan 
government). 
 109. See United Fruit Historical Society, Chronology, http://www.unitedfruit. 
org/chron.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2012) (describing the United Fruit Company’s history, its 
extensive influence, and the freedoms the Guatemalan government allowed the company) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 110. See Reverby, supra note 2, at 9 (“[T]he PHS cooperated with officials at the 
Guatemala’s Ministry of Health, the National Army of the Revolution, the National Mental 
Health Hospital and Ministry of Justice on what was benignly called ‘a series of 
experimental studies on syphilis in man.’”). 
 111. See id. at 17 (“[The Guatemalan officials] asked Cutler to test and treat men in 
army barracks, to do surveys of disease in the lowlands, and to provide more penicillin for 
the country as part of the price for cooperation.  He traded off drugs for malaria at the 
orphanage for the right to continue blood testing.”). 
 112. See CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, supra note 4, at 5 (stating that 
the PASB received a grant from the United States to conduct the Guatemala study with the 
aid of U.S. personnel and Guatemalan cooperation). 
 113. See Seventh Pan American Sanitary Conference, The Pan American Sanitary 
Code:  International Sanitary Convention Signed at Habana, Cuba, November 14, 1924, 40 
PUB. HEALTH REP. 483, 484–85 (1925), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/ 
pmc/articles/PMC1975980/pdf/pubhealthreporig02451-0001.pdf (stating that “[t]he 
Presidents of Argentine, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, 
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Salvador, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, United States of 
America, Uruguay, and Venezuela” entered into a sanitary convention to promote and 
protect the health of their nations). 
 114. See id. at 483 (“In executive session on February 23, 1925, the Senate of the 
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was to “better promot[e] and protect[] the public health.”115  The code 
focused on preventing the spread of infectious diseases by mandating each 
country to report outbreaks of diseases and take precautionary measures at 
borders, ports, or airports.116  Significantly, despite extensive regulation of 
travel, the code mentions no premium on the value of human life or dignity, 
an attitude shared by the Guatemala study’s research team.117 
In addition to oversight imposed by the PASB, the World Health 
Organization (WHO), a specialized agency of the United Nations, ratified a 
constitution in 1946 onto which both the United States and Guatemala 
signed.118  Guatemala and the United States dedicated themselves to the 
objective of “attainment by all peoples of the highest possible level of 
health”119 and “developing an informed public opinion among all peoples 
on matters of health.”120  However, the WHO did not have its First World 
Health Assembly until 1948.121  Prior to the Assembly, the Interim 
Commission endeavored to take over the fight against venereal diseases and 
to integrate regional health organizations such as the PASB.122  As a result, 
the WHO did not have much influence during the time of the Guatemala 
study, and the PASB’s goals, with its minimal concern for individuals, 
remained the dominant attitude.123 
                                                                                                                 
United States ratified the international sanitary convention of the American 
Republics . . . .”). 
 115. Id. at 484. 
 116. See id. at 489–97 (discussing the sanitary codes and documentation needed for 
people traveling and transporting goods between countries). 
 117. See generally id. at 483–98. 
 118. See Constitution of the World Health Organization (New York, July 22, 1946) 14 
U.N.T.S. 185, entered into force Apr. 7, 1948, available at http://whqlibdoc. 
who.int/hist/official_records/constitution.pdf (showing the signatures of the delegates of 
Guatemala and the United States). 
 119. Id. at Chapter I:  Objective, Art. 1.  
 120. Id. at Chapter II:  Functions, Art. 2(r). 
 121. See YVES BEIGBEDER, THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, 12–13 (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers 1998) (stating that the First World Health Assembly met in June 1948 
when it adopted most of the policies of the Interim Commission). 
 122. See id. at 12 (stating that objectives of the Interim Commission were to take over 
“the activities of former health organizations,” which included fighting against venereal 
diseases and integrating regional health organizations). 
 123. See supra note 36–59 and accompanying text (discussing the PASB’s lack of 
concern for human life and dignity). 
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4.  Compliance of the Researchers 
The medical researchers in Guatemala did not seek consent from the 
study participants and tried to conceal their actions.124  However, given the 
notoriety of human experimentation, the U.S. researchers were likely aware 
of the issue.125  When one evaluates the researchers’ choices against U.S., 
Guatemalan, and international standards, a confusing picture emerges. 
Both the U.S. medical profession and the American public altered their 
opinions repeatedly on the matter of human experimentation during the first 
half of the twentieth century—advocating against experimentation, denying 
that experimentation occurred, and finally turning a blind eye.126  Early 
ethical code proposals were largely ignored,127 and when one considers the 
events of the Guatemala study and the legality of those actions, it is 
important to note that while the AMA’s advisory statement may have 
tugged at the moral heartstrings of physicians, it was not binding.128 The 
medical profession favored medical progress rather than informed 
consent.129  Still, the researchers in Guatemala tried to conceal their 
actions130 because they realized the profession would not publicly approve 
of the methods used.131 
Like the medical profession, U.S. case law sent a conflicting message.  
Under Schloendorff, a doctor ought to seek informed consent,132 and 
                                                                                                                 
 124. See Reverby, supra note 2, at 16–18 (discussing the deceptions that characterized 
the research). 
 125. See id. at 18–20 (discussing the concerns that Cutler and other U.S. researchers 
had about the ethics of the study). 
 126. See supra notes 60–63 and accompanying text (discussing early activism against 
medical experimentation without consent and the changes in attitude with the advent of 
World Wars I and II). 
 127. See supra note 65 and accompanying text (stating that the effect of ethical codes 
during this time were “practically nil”). 
 128. See American Medical Association House of Delegates, supra note 76, at 1379 
(stating that the AMA ethical code was only “suggested and advisory”). 
 129. See supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text (discussing the attitude of the 
medical profession post-World Wars I and II). 
 130. See id. (noting that the researchers tried to experiment in secrecy, and Cutler’s 
supervisor warned, “I hope you will not hesitate to stop the experimental work in the event 
of there being an undue amount of interest in that phase of the study”). 
 131. See Reverby, supra note 2, at 20 (“Cutler, too, acknowledged that other 
syphilogists thought human experimentation on penicillin as a prevention for syphilis that 
required inoculation with the disease ‘could not be ethically carried out.’”). 
 132. See supra notes 89–94 and accompanying text (discussing that Schloendorff 
established the importance of informed consent in medical procedures). 
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Skinner suggested that criminals may claim similar protections.133  
However, because Buck v. Bell was not overruled, it remained unclear 
whether asylum patients have comparable rights.134  Moreover, no U.S. 
legislation or case law defined what was appropriate internationally.135  In 
addition to the cacophony of U.S. messages, the Guatemalan government 
prioritized providing services to its people rather than protection of 
individual rights.136  International organizations did not clarify ethics either.  
The United States and Guatemala had voluntarily signed onto the WHO 
constitution, which valued developing an informed public opinion.137  Yet, 
the United States and Guatemala supported the methods employed at the 
Guatemala study; thus, the Guatemala researchers did not comply with a 
guideline to which their governing country had voluntarily agreed. 
The researchers did not fulfill the spirit of U.S. law or other standards 
because researchers did not prioritize the health and safety of patients by 
seeking consent.138  Instead, the researchers pursued medical science’s gain 
in a developing country with vulnerable people.  Although the researchers 
may not have been legally bound to seek informed consent, it is more 
accurate to characterize them as intentionally avoiding the law.  They 
deliberately deceived the participants139 and knew their practices would not 
be received well in U.S. medical circles.140   In addition, they sought a 
testing site in Guatemala, far from the United States’ jurisdiction.  
However, if one considers the combination of confusing legal standards and 
the regularity of experimenting on human subjects at that time, the context 
                                                                                                                 
 133. See supra note 91 and accompanying text (suggesting that the Supreme Court 
implied that consent to medical procedures, specifically sexual sterilization, must be given 
by the individual rather than the State). 
 134. See supra note 91 and accompanying text (stating that the Supreme Court found 
that the State may substitute its consent to a medical procedure, specifically sexual 
sterilization, for that of an intellectually disabled person). 
 135. See supra notes 66–87 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of U.S. 
legislation and case law that applied in the international context). 
 136. See supra note 111 and accompanying text (stating that the Guatemalan 
government cooperated so that its people received other medical services). 
 137. See supra notes 119–26 and accompanying text (discussing the WHO’s goals of 
providing the public with an informed opinion). 
 138. See supra notes 66–87 and accompanying text (discussing the consent 
requirements found in U.S. case law and implied in the AMA’s Code). 
 139. See Reverby, supra note 2, at 16 (“Deception was central [to the researchers of the 
study].”). 
 140. See id. at 18 (“Everyone involved with these studies [in Guatemala] seemed to 
know they were treading on complicated ethical grounds.”). 
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of the research renders the researchers’ actions more explicable, not more 
sympathetic. 
II.  Modern Informed Consent 
The director of the National Institutes for Health, Dr. Francis Collins, 
characterized the Guatemala study as “a dark chapter in the history of 
medicine.”141  This dark chapter includes a litany of twentieth century U.S. 
studies such as STD studies at Tuskegee,142 studies that abused prisoners143 
or patients of mental institutions,144 and studies that exploited the poor.145 
Unlike the 1940s, there are now a host of modern ethics standards for 
conducting research on human subjects outside the United States.146  The 
landscape of informed consent has changed significantly, both domestically 
and internationally.  The CDC asserted human subjects are protected by 
federal regulations that require Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) to 
monitor research continuously,147 mandate that researchers fully explain the 
risks of participation and thereafter acquire informed consent, 148 and 
protect vulnerable populations.149  The CDC did not mention the 
                                                                                                                 
 141. The CNN Wire Staff, supra note 3. 
 142. See generally SUSAN REVERBY, EXAMINING TUSKEGEE:  THE INFAMOUS SYPHILIS 
STUDY AND ITS LEGACY (Waldo E. Martin Jr. & Patricia Sullivan eds., The University of 
North Carolina Press) (2010) (exploring the events of the Tuskegee syphilis experiment and 
the implications afterwards for medicine and “American life”). 
 143. See Allen M. Horblum, They Were Cheap and Available:  Prisoners as Research 
Subjects in Twentieth Century America, 315 BRIT. MED. J. 1437, 1437–41 (1997) (describing 
the history of using prisoners and the shift in the medical community from viewing prisoners 
as “raw material for medical experiments” at the beginning of the century to ending the 
practice in the 1970s). 
 144. See generally WEYERS, supra note 57. 
 145. See  id. 
 146. See, e.g., UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA HUMAN RESEARCH PROTECTION 
PROGRAM, POLICY NO. 304:  TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN SUBJECTS RESEARCH (2010), available 
at http://www.research.usf.edu/dric/hrpp/irbpolicies/Policy%20304%20Transnational%20 
Human%20Subjects%20Research.pdf (establishing guidelines for use when USF or a USF 
affiliate conducts human subject research outside the United States). 
 147. See INFORMATION ON PROTECTION, supra note 61, at 2 (“Human subject research is 
reviewed and approved by an IRB . . . .”). 
 148. See id. (“Dr. Cutler and his colleagues used deception to infect vulnerable captive 
individuals in Guatemala.  This is prohibited today.  Researchers must fully explain the risks 
associated with their study to all research participants.  Participants must indicate their 
informed consent.”). 
 149. See id. (“Current Federal regulations provide additional protections and special 
requirements for research involving children and prisoners and instruct IRBs to be cognizant 
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effectiveness of international sources in protecting human subjects, but 
these sources are still influential and aided in shaping U.S. regulations.150 
Ultimately, though there is a concerted effort to regulate human subject 
research, exact legal requirements remain confusing, just as informed 
consent regulations did at the time of the Guatemala study. 
A.  The Belmont Report 
The Belmont Report was created in 1979 and was one of the first U.S. 
efforts to address the ethics of human experimentation.151  Its basic 
principles intend to “assist in resolving ethical problems” that arise when 
researchers use human subjects.152  The Report values three principles:  
respect, beneficence, and justice.153  Respect represents a dual moral 
obligation that recognizes not only the right of each individual to exercise 
autonomy, but also that a person with diminished capacity (and therefore 
diminished autonomy) deserves protection.154  Beneficence obliges 
researchers firstly, to do no harm, and secondly, to maximize benefits and 
                                                                                                                 
of the special problems of research involving vulnerable populations  . . . Studies seeking to 
enroll vulnerable subjects must provide additional safeguards to protect the rights and 
welfare of these subjects.”). 
 150. See Joan M. Doherty, Form Over Substance:  The Inadequacy of Informed 
Consent and Ethical Review for Thai Injection Drug Users Enrolled in HIV Vaccine Trials, 
15 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 101, 112 (2006) (“Nonetheless, the Nuremberg Code and 
Declaration of Helsinki  . . . have all influenced the creation of law and policy in the United 
States.”) (citations omitted). 
 151. See National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and 
Behavioral Research, The Belmont Report:  Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the 
Protection of Human Subjects of Research Summary (1979), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/05/briefing/2005-4178b_09_02_Belmont%20 
Report.pdf (“[The Belmont Report] is the outgrowth of an intensive four-day period of 
discussions that were held in February 1976 at the Smithsonian Institution’s Belmont 
Conference Center supplemented by the monthly deliberations of the Commission that were 
held over a period of nearly four years.”). 
 152. See id. (stating that the Belmont Report “is a statement of basic ethical principles 
and guidelines that should assist in resolving the ethical problems that surround the conduct 
of research with human subjects”). 
 153. See id. at Part B (“Three basic principles, among those generally accepted in our 
cultural tradition, are particularly relevant to the ethics of research involving human 
subjects:  the principles of respect of persons, beneficence and justice.”). 
 154. See id. at Part B.1 (“Respect for persons incorporates at least two ethical 
convictions:  first, that individuals should be treated as autonomous agents, and second, that 
persons with diminished autonomy are entitled to protection.”). 
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minimize risks.155  The last concept of justice denotes a concern with 
distribution of fairness,156 which can be conceptualized as equality.157 
In applying the principles of respect, beneficence, and justice, 
informed consent emerges as a necessity.158  Informed consent gives 
subjects the “opportunity to choose what shall or shall not happen to 
them.”159  This opportunity to choose is provided when the elements of 
information, comprehension, and voluntariness are satisfied.160  Information 
demands sufficient disclosure,161 which includes answering a subject’s 
direct inquiries honestly and never withholding information about risks.162  
To ensure comprehension, researchers must “adapt the presentation of the 
information to the subject’s capacities,”163 and as risks to the subject 
increase, so does the obligation to certify comprehension.164  Lastly, 
consent must be given voluntarily, without coercion or undue influence.165 
                                                                                                                 
 155. See id. at Part B.2 (defining beneficence as an obligation; as a result, “[t]wo 
general rules have been formulated as complementary expressions of beneficent actions in 
this sense:  (1) do not harm and (2) maximize possible benefits and minimize possible 
harms”). 
 156. See id. at Part B.3 (stating that justice is choosing “[w]ho ought to receive the 
benefits of research and bear its burdens” and “[a]n injustice occurs when some benefit to 
which a person is entitled is denied without good reason or when some burden is imposed 
unduly”). 
 157. See id.  (“Another way of conceiving the principle of justice is that equals ought to 
be treated equally.”). 
 158. See id. at Part C.1 (“Applications of the general principles to the conduct of 
research leads to consideration of the following requirements:  informed consent, risk/benefit 
assessment, and the selection of subjects of research.”). 
 159. Id. 
 160. See id. (stating that the opportunity for choice “is provided when adequate 
standards for informed consent are satisfied” and “there is widespread agreement that the 
consent process can be analyzed as containing three elements:  information, comprehension, 
and voluntariness”). 
 161. See id. (stating that disclosure is “intended to assure that subjects are given 
sufficient information” and “[e]ven when some direct benefit to them is anticipated, the 
subjects should understand clearly the range of risk and the voluntary nature of 
participation”). 
 162. See id. (“Information about risks should never be withheld for the purpose of 
eliciting the cooperation of subjects, and truthful answers should always be given to direct 
questions about the research.”). 
 163. See id. (“Because the subject’s ability to understand is a function of intelligence, 
rationality, maturity, and language, it is necessary to adapt the presentation of the 
information to the subject’s capacities.”). 
 164. See id. (“While there is always an obligation to ascertain that the information 
about risk to subjects is complete and adequately comprehended, when the risks are more 
serious, that obligation increases.”). 
 165. See id. (“An agreement to participate in research constitutes a valid consent only if 
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B.  The DHHS & the FDA’s Current Regulations 
Building on the Belmont Report’s ethical foundation,166 the central 
improvement to U.S. legal standards since the Guatemala study is federal 
regulation.  The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) and 
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulate all experiments 
involving human subjects in a dovetailing fashion so that at times they 
govern jointly and at other times independently.167 
The DHHS binds fifteen U.S. agencies168 and broadly oversees all 
human experiments that are “conducted, supported or otherwise subject to 
regulation by any federal department or agency.”169  Because the DHHS’s 
authority stems from the Spending Clause,170 its regulation is limited to 
instances where U.S. funds are involved.171  DHHS regulations are known 
                                                                                                                 
voluntarily given.  This element of informed consent requires conditions free of coercion and 
undue influence.”). 
 166. See Doherty, supra note 153, at 114 (“By promoting the concepts of respect for 
persons, beneficence, and justice, the Belmont Report provides the ethical foundation for the 
current federal laws governing research on human subjects in the United States.”). 
 167. See Couture, supra note 66, at 134 (“The two agencies work in an interlocking 
system in which one or both govern all human experiments.”) (citing Sharona 
Hoffman, Regulating Clinical Research:  Informed Consent, Privacy and IRBs, 31 CAP. U. 
L. REV. 71, 76 (2003)). 
 168. See Yevengia Shtilman, Pharmaceutical Drug Testing in the Former Soviet 
Union:  Contract Research Organizations as Broker-Dealers in an Emerging Testing 
Ground for America’s Big Pharma, 29 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 425, 438 (2009) (“Perhaps 
the most important regulation pertaining to human trials conducted both within and outside 
the United States to date is the DHHS policy for the protection of human subjects, referred 
to as the Common Rule because it binds fifteen agencies in addition to DHHS.”) (citing 
Markus Schott, Medical Research on Humans:  Regulation in Switzerland, the European 
Union and the United States, 60 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 45, 65 (2005)). 
 169. See Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(a) (2010); see also Sharona 
Hoffman, Regulating Clinical Research:  Informed Consent, Privacy, and IRBs, 31 CAP. U. 
L. REV. 71, 75–76 (2003) (“Clinical trials that involve treatments other than drugs and 
devices, such as surgery or bone marrow transplants, are not regulated by the FDA and are 
subject to DHHS regulation only if they are ‘conducted, supported or otherwise subject to 
regulation by any federal department or agency.’”). 
 170. See Robert Charrow, Protection of Human Subjects:  Is Expansive Regulation 
Counter-Productive?, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 707, 713 (2007) (“The Common Rule [of the 
DHHS] is a child of the Spending Clause—the constitutional provision that authorizes the 
federal government to spend money and, by implication, to impose conditions on the receipt 
of that money.”) (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 
212 (1987)). 
 171. See Doherty, supra note 150, at 114–15 (“[R]esearch that is entirely funded by 
private sources (rather than government sources) lacks the requisite federal nexus for the 
Common Rule [of the DHHS] to apply.”) (citing 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(a)). 
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as the “Common Rule,” and they require informed consent and Institutional 
Review Boards for all government-funded research.172  The FDA is an 
agency under the DHHS,173 but it derives its authority from the Commerce 
Clause.174  The FDA’s scope is also limited to regulating clinical trials that 
develop new drugs and devices.175  The FDA regulates private companies 
that “research on populations outside of the United States . . . if the 
company ultimately intends to seek FDA approval for use of the product in 
the United States.”176  The FDA has protections similar to the Common 
Rule, but did not elect to incorporate it.177  Instead, the FDA requires 
compliance with additional protocols.178  As a result, the Common Rule 
governs research funded by the U.S. government, but private entities are 
regulated only if they seek FDA approval.179  Nevertheless, no matter which 
agency governs, both require informed consent and IRBs.180 
                                                                                                                 
 172. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101–.505 (2010) (outlining various regulations for federally 
funded medical research involving human subjects); see also Gail Javitt, Why Not Take All 
of Me?  Reflections on the Immortal Life of Henrietta Lacks and the Status of Participants in 
Research Using Human Specimens, 11 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 713, 713 (2010) (“The 
‘Common Rule,’ as the federal human subject protection regulations are known as, sets forth 
requirements for the protection of all human subjects of federally funded research.”) (citing 
45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101–.505 (2009)). 
 173. See Couture, supra note 66, at 134 (“Although the FDA is an agency under the 
Department of Health and Human Services, it has taken the frontal role of regulating human 
experimentation, specifically in the areas of pharmaceuticals, biologies and medical 
devices.”) (citing Sharona Hoffman, Regulating Clinical Research:  Informed Consent, 
Privacy and IRBs, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 71, 76 (2003)). 
 174. See Charrow, supra note 170, at 713 (“[T]he FDA derives its jurisdiction from the 
Commerce Clause.”) (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3). 
 175. See Enforcement Policy, 21 C.F.R. § 7.3(f) (2010) (defining the “products” under 
FDA jurisdiction as “including any food, drug, and device intended for human or animal use, 
any cosmetic and biologic intended for human use”). 
 176. Doherty, supra note 150, at 115. 
 177. See id. (“The FDA did not sign on to the Common Rule, and therefore has a 
separate basis for regulating research on human subjects.”) (citations omitted). 
 178. See id. (stating that a sponsor of a drug or vaccine “must file an investigational 
new drug application (‘IND’) with the FDA[, and i]f IND approval is secured by an 
investigator, then the study may begin, subject to strict compliance with the protocols 
accepted by the FDA”) (citing DALE E. HAMMERSCHMIDT, UNDERSTANDING THE FDA’S IND 
PROCESS, IN INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD:  MANAGEMENT AND FUNCTION 323, 325 (Robert 
J. Amdur & Elizabeth A. Bankert eds., 2002)). 
 179. See id. (“[T]he federal system of protections applies only to research funded by a 
federal agency that is subject to the Common Rule, and to private entities that will ultimately 
seek FDA review and approval.”) (citing INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, RESPONSIBLE RESEARCH:  
A SYSTEMS APPROACH TO PROTECTING RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS 138 (2003)). 
 180. See supra note 172 and accompanying text (discussing that both the Common Rule 
and the FDA require informed consent and IRBs). 
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The informed consent requirements of the Common Rule and the FDA 
are “virtually identical.”181  At a minimum, researchers must disclose the 
purpose of the research, its procedures; any “reasonably foreseeable” risks 
and discomforts; reasonable benefits of participation; any alternative and 
beneficial procedures; the confidentiality of the records kept; compensation 
and availability of medical treatment for injury; contact information for 
questions or in case of injury; and a statement that participation is voluntary 
and at-will.182  Even if a participant signs a document indicating consent, 
the document is merely a record of informed consent; not informed consent 
itself.183  Researchers must ensure that when presenting information and 
receiving a signature, the participant gives bona fide consent.184 
The Common Rule and the FDA also require Institutional Review 
Boards.185  The purpose of an IRB is to protect the rights and welfare of 
human subjects,186 so IRBs have specific approval criteria for a proposed 
clinical trial as well as standards the trial must maintain.187  Before an IRB 
may approve a clinical trial, the IRB follows the Belmont Report’s 
requirements by ensuring that “(1) informed consent is obtained from 
subjects and documented (respect for persons, or autonomy),188 (2) the risks 
                                                                                                                 
 181. See Doherty, supra note 150, at 116 (“The general requirements for informed 
consent are virtually identical in the Common Rule and the FDA regulations.”) (citations 
omitted). 
 182. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a) (2010) (listing the Common Rule’s elements of 
informed consent); see also 21 C.F.R. § 50.25 (2010) (listing the FDA’s elements of 
informed consent). 
 183. See Doherty, supra note 150, at 116–17 (“A document with a signature is not 
consent, but is merely a record of what was supposed to have been communicated between 
researchers and prospective participants.”) (citations omitted). 
 184. See id. at 116 (“It is important for investigators to understand the difference 
between ‘the presentation of the information, and even the signing of the consent document, 
and bona fide consent.’”) (quoting ROBIN L. PENSLAR, THE IRB’S ROLE IN EDITING THE 
CONSENT DOCUMENT, IN INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD:  MANAGEMENT AND FUNCTION 233 
(Robert J. Amdur & Elizabeth A. Bankert eds., 2002)). 
 185. See id. (stating one of the primary protections required by the Common Rule and 
the FDA regulations is “prior review of proposed research by an independent ethical review 
committee”) (citing Ezekiel J. Emanuel et al., Oversight of Human Participants Research:  
Identifying Problems to Evaluate Reform Proposals, 141 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 282, 
282 (2004)). 
 186. See Institutional Review Boards, 21 C.F.R. § 56.102(g) (2010) (stating the primary 
purpose of an IRB’s “review is to assure the protection of the rights and welfare of the 
human subjects”). 
 187. See Hoffman, supra note 169, at 77–78 (describing the details of IRB 
requirements). 
 188.  Doherty supra note 150, at 117 (citing 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.111(a)(4) & (5) (2005); 21 
C.F.R. §§ 56.111(a)(4) & (5) (2005)). 
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to subjects are minimized and are reasonable in relation to benefits 
(beneficence),189 and (3) the selection of subjects is equitable (justice).”190  
Moreover, the proposed clinical trial must be sensitive to vulnerable 
populations such as children, prisoners, pregnant women, mentally disabled 
persons, and economically or educationally disadvantaged persons.191  Even 
with these requirements, IRBs have a great deal of discretion and may 
require disclosure of additional information if “the information would 
meaningfully add to the protection of the rights and welfare of subjects.”192 
Despite the protections of informed consent and IRBs, the Common 
Rule contains loopholes and the FDA’s oversight may be inapplicable.  
Research in foreign countries may substitute compliance with foreign 
procedures for the Common Rule if the “procedures . . . afford protections 
that are at least equivalent” to the Common Rule, which opens the 
possibility for relaxed oversight.193  Also, because research must have a 
federal nexus for the Common Rule to apply,194 the DHHS cannot regulate 
privately funded research.195  Fortunately, the FDA is not so restricted and 
can regulate private clinical trials that develop new drugs and devices to be 
marketed in the United States.196  In fact, the FDA does not “permit reliance 
                                                                                                                 
 189.  Id. (citing 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.111(a)(1) & (2) (2005); 21 C.F.R. §§ 56.111(a)(1) & 
(2) (2005)). 
 190. Id. (citing 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(3) (2005); 21 C.F.R. § 56.111(a)(3) (2005)). 
 191. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(b) (2010) (requiring the inclusion of additional safeguards 
in studies to protect the rights and welfare of vulnerable subjects from the effects of coercion 
and undue influence); see also 21 C.F.R. § 56.111(b) (2010) (stating that additional 
safeguards are included in the study when some or all of the subjects are likely to be 
vulnerable to coercion or undue influence). 
 192. 45 C.F.R. § 46.109(b) (2010); 21 C.F.R. § 56.109 (2010). 
 193. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(h) (2010) (“[I]f a department or agency head determines 
that the procedures prescribed by the institution afford protections that are at least equivalent 
to those provided in this policy, the department or agency head may approve the substitution 
of the foreign procedures in lieu of [this policy’s] procedural requirements . . . .”). 
 194. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(a) (stating that the DHHS’s authority “applies to all 
research involving human subjects conducted, supported or otherwise subject to regulation 
by any federal department or agency which takes appropriate administrative action to make 
the policy applicable to such research”); see also Doherty, supra note 150, at 115 
(“[R]esearch that is entirely funded by private sources (rather than government sources) 
lacks the requisite federal nexus for the Common Rule [of the DHHS] to apply.”) (citing 45 
C.F.R. § 46.101(a)). 
 195. See Doherty, supra note 150, at 115 (“In the case of privately-funded research by 
pharmaceutical companies, the federal government would need an additional basis [other 
than the Common Rule] for regulating.”).   
 196. See 21 C.F.R. § 7.3(f) (2010) (stating that the FDA has jurisdiction over articles, 
“including any food, drug, and device intended for human or animal use, any cosmetic and 
biologic intended for human use”). 
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on a host country’s ethics guidelines.”197  The FDA may only regulate a 
private actor that intends to market the drug in the United States.198  
Consequently, private companies that engage in clinical research overseas 
but opt not to market their product in the United States are subject to no 
federal oversight.  Without federal oversight, participants could be exposed 
to abusive practices. 
Unfortunately, federal protections have been labeled an “elaborate 
ritual” both because participants do not actually understand risks and 
benefits199 and because frequently “the informed consent process serves 
only to insulate the researcher from subsequent malpractice claims and fails 
to provide the subject with the prospective benefit intended by the 
doctrine.”200  Moreover, IRBs have been criticized for not protecting human 
subjects effectively due to conflicts of interest201 (despite federal 
prohibitions),202 for valuing success of the experiment over ethics,203 and 
                                                                                                                 
 197. Remigius N. Nwabueze, Ethical Review of Research Involving Human Test 
Subjects in Nigeria:  Legal and Policy Issues, 14 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 87, 110 (2003). 
 198. See Doherty, supra note 150, at 115 (“[T]he federal system of protections applies 
only to research funded by a federal agency that is subject to the Common Rule, and to 
private entities that will ultimately seek FDA review and approval.”) (citing INSTITUTE OF 
MEDICINE, RESPONSIBLE RESEARCH:  A SYSTEMS APPROACH TO PROTECTING RESEARCH 
PARTICIPANTS 138 (2003)). 
 199. See Grimm, supra note 81, at 46 (“[T]he informed consent process for research 
has been characterized as an ‘elaborate ritual’ that does not result in true informed consent 
because of a lack of understanding regarding the risks and benefits of participation.”) (citing 
Sandra J. Carnahan, Promoting Medical Research Without Sacrificing Patient Autonomy:  
Legal and Ethical Issues Raised by the Waiver of Informed Consent for Emergency 
Research, 52 OKLA. L. REV. 565, 575 (1999)). 
 200. Id. (citing Sandra J. Carnahan, Promoting Medical Research Without Sacrificing 
Patient Autonomy:  Legal and Ethical Issues Raised by the Waiver of Informed Consent for 
Emergency Research, 52 OKLA. L. REV. 565, 575 (1999)). 
 201. See id. at 62–63 ("Some argue that an  inherent conflict of interest exists because 
IRB members are potentially reluctant to pass judgment on their own colleagues’ research 
due to the fact that they could find themselves applying to an IRB in the future for 
permission to conduct research.”) (citing Sandra J. Carnahan, Promoting Medical Research 
Without Sacrificing Patient Autonomy:  Legal and Ethical Issues Raised by the Waiver of 
Informed Consent for Emergency Research, 52 OKLA. L. REV. 565, 586–87 (1999)). 
 202. See Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R § 46.107(e) (2010) (“No IRB may 
have a member participate in [an] initial or continuing review of any project in which the 
member has a conflicting interest.”); see also Grimm, supra note 81, at 63 (stating the 
conflict of interest problem “persists despite the fact that the federal regulations prohibit 
members with conflicts of interest from participating within the IRB”) (citations omitted). 
 203. See Grimm, supra note 81, at 63 (“IRBs can also experience difficulty in 
remaining true to their mission.  In Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Institute, Inc., a Maryland 
appellate court stated that IRBs can place a premium on the success of experiments, often to 
the detriment of the ethicality of experiments.”) (citing Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., 
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for inadequate review.204  As a result, even though the Belmont Report’s 
principles are reflected in U.S. regulation, ethics glitches persist.205 
C.  International Guidelines 
Since the Guatemala study, not only have domestic regulations 
developed, but international guidelines have also blossomed.  Modern 
informed consent typically requires that the human subject (or legally 
authorized representative) voluntarily consent to participate after being 
informed in a manner he or she understands.206  The two leading guidelines 
are the Nuremberg Code and the Declaration of Helsinki, but other 
international guidelines that address informed consent and continue to 
influence the United States include the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and the World Health Organization’s Guidelines for Good 
Clinical Practice. 
One of the first international guidelines was the Nuremberg Code, 
which was created in 1947 in response to Nazi medical experimentation.207  
The Code finds voluntary informed consent “absolutely essential.”208  
Additionally, an experiment should avoid unnecessary pain and injury to 
participants,209 and subjects must have “sufficient knowledge and 
comprehension of the elements of the subjects matter involved . . . to make 
                                                                                                                 
Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 817 (Md. 2001)). 
 204. See id. at 63–64 (stating a report presented to the Government Reform and 
Oversight Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives in 1998 “concluded that IRBs 
conducted only minimal ongoing review of research, . . . that too much was reviewed at too 
great a speed, that insufficient resources were allocated,” and that “little training was 
provided”) (citations omitted). 
 205. See supra notes 188-92 and accompanying text (discussing how the Belmont 
Report’s principles are reflected in U.S. federal regulations). 
 206. See, e.g., Doherty, supra note 150, at 110 (“Informed consent provides a process 
for ensuring and documenting that a research participant (or his or her legally authorized 
representative) has acted according to his or her informed, considered, and freely made 
judgment.”) (citations omitted). 
 207. See Sarah Bahir, An International Legal System Regulating the Trade in the 
Pharmaceutical Sector and Services Provided by Human Subjects, 6 ASPER REV. INT'L BUS. 
& TRADE L. 157, 165 (2006) (“In response to the Doctors Trial (1946-1947), the Nuremberg 
Code was designed to safeguard the rights of subjects in medical research.”) (citations 
omitted). 
 208. See NUREMBERG CODE (1947), available at http://www.fhi.org/training/en/ 
RETC2/Resources/nuremburg_code.pdf (“The voluntary consent of the human subject is 
absolutely essential.”). 
 209. See id. (“The experiment should be so conducted as to avoid all unnecessary 
physical and mental suffering and injury.”). 
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an understanding and enlightened decision” to participate.210  The Code has 
never been adopted or ratified by the United States,211 and it may have lost 
current application as more expansive ethics guidelines have formed.212  
Still, “courts in the United States have allowed the Code to be introduced as 
evidence of ethical principles existing in customary international law.”213 
Because it was initially believed that the Nuremberg Code applied 
only to war crimes, not physicians,214 organizations created other ethical 
guidelines.215  In 1964 the World Medical Association adopted the 
Declaration of Helsinki, and it is now the most renowned set of guidelines 
for human research.216  From 1978 to 2008 it was referenced in FDA 
regulations as a general ethical guideline.217  Unlike the Nuremberg Code, 
the Declaration does not mandate informed consent.218  It requires 
researchers, however, to inform subjects of anticipated benefits, risks, and 
                                                                                                                 
 210. Id. 
 211. See Shtilman, supra note 168, at 448 (“The United States has neither ratified nor 
adopted the Nuremberg Code.”) (citing Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 
807, 850 (Md. 2001); Ammend v. Bioport, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 2d 848, 872 (W.D. Mich. 
2004)). 
 212. See Bahir, supra note 207, at 165 (“The Nuremberg Code has historical 
significance; but, its current application has  . . . waned as more expansive ethical codes have 
risen.”). 
 213. Shtilman, supra note 168, at 449 (citations omitted). 
 214. See Doherty, supra note 150, at 111 (“For many years after the creation of the 
Nuremberg Code, most physicians believed that the Code primarily applied to war crimes, 
and not to the medical establishment.”) (citing Joanne Roman, U.S. Medical Research in the 
Developing World:  Ignoring Nuremberg, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 441, 451 (2002)). 
 215. See id. (“Subsequent documents developed by international organizations provided 
guidelines for ethics in research, and were intended to apply to multinational and 
intranational research.”). 
 216. See Bahir, supra note 207, at 165 (“The Declaration of Helsinki, adopted in 1964 
by the World Medical Association, is the most recognized set of guidelines in the area of 
biomedical research.”). 
 217. See Adam H. Laughton, Note, Somewhere to Run, Somewhere to Hide?:  
International Regulation of Human Subject Experimentation, 18 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 
181, 196 (2007) (“The Declaration was signed by the United States in 1975 and incorporated 
by the FDA into their regulations for overseas clinical research that same year.  In spite of 
having been adopted into FDA regulations, the Declaration is a general statement of ethics, 
not a collection of legally binding principles.”) (citations omitted). 
 218. See DECLARATION OF HELSINKI Part B.13 (2000), available at 
http://ohsr.od.nih.gov/guidelines/helsinki.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2012) (“After ensuring 
that the subject has understood the information, the physician should then obtain the 
subject’s freely-given informed consent, preferably in writing.  If the consent cannot be 
obtained in writing, the non-written consent must be formally documented and witnessed.”) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
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potential discomfort,219 and vulnerable populations are afforded special 
protections.220  The Declaration, like U.S. federal regulations,221 suggests 
ethical review committees,222 whereas the Nuremberg Code places ethical 
responsibility directly with researchers.223  The Declaration is not legally 
binding on the United States,224 although its “principles have been followed 
in other international, regional, and national guidelines and regulations.”225 
Despite the influential value of the other guidelines, the only legally 
binding treaty on the United States is the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR).226  Article 7 of the ICCPR states, “[n]o one 
shall be subject to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.  In particular, no one shall be subjected without his free 
                                                                                                                 
 219. See id. (“In any research on human beings, each potential subject must be 
adequately informed of the aims, methods, sources of funding, any possible conflicts of 
interest, institutional affiliations of the researcher, the anticipated benefits and potential risks 
of the study and the discomfort it may entail.”). 
 220. See id. at Part A.8 (“Some research populations are vulnerable and need special 
protection.  The particular needs of the economically and medically disadvantaged must be 
recognized.”). 
 221. See Shtilman, supra note 168, at 448 (“U.S. federal regulations depart from the 
Code’s emphasis on the researcher’s authority in that they place responsibility with research 
institutions and IRBs rather than with the researchers themselves.”) (citing Adam H. 
Laughton, Note, Somewhere to Run, Somewhere to Hide?:  International Regulation of 
Human Subject Experimentation, 18 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 181, 194 (2007)). 
 222. See DECLARATION OF HELSINKI, supra note 218, at Part B.4 (stating that 
independent ethical review committees have “the right to monitor ongoing trials,” and 
should provide guidance and approval on ethical issues, and “be in conformity with the laws 
and regulations of the country in which the research experiment is performed”). 
 223. See Shtilman, supra note 168, at 447 (“Unlike the FDA regulations and the 
Declaration of Helsinki, the Nuremberg Code places the responsibility of ensuring ethical 
medical experimentation directly in the hands of researchers.”) (citing James 
Cekola, Outsourcing Drug Investigations to India:  A Comment on U.S., Indian and 
International Regulation of Clinical Trials in Cross-Border Pharmaceutical Research, 28 
Nw. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 125, 144 (2007)). 
 224. See Daniels, supra note 13, at 213–14 (stating the Declaration of Helsinki is 
“accepted by the international medical community as providing for the highest standards of 
medical ethics in human experimentation, although in most countries, [including the United 
States], [it] lacks the force of law”) (citing Barry R. Bloom, The Highest Attainable 
Standard:  Ethical Issues in AIDS Vaccines, 279 SCI. 186, 186 (1998)). 
 225. See Bahir, supra note 207, at 166 (citations omitted). 
 226. See Kristen Farrell, Human Experimentation in Developing Countries:  Improving 
International Practices by Identifying Vulnerable Populations and Allocating Fair Benefits, 
9 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 136, 143 (2006) (“The ICCPR is the only legally binding 
international treaty concerning human experimentation.”) (citing Finnuala Kelleher, Note, 
The Pharmaceutical Industry’s Responsibility for Protecting Human Subjects of Clinical 
Trials in Developing Nations, 38 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 67, 73 (2004)). 
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consent to medical or scientific experimentation.”227  Unfortunately, the 
ICCPR is self-enforcing and applies only to state actors; aside from 
establishing informed consent as a principle of law, it merely imparts 
abstract rights.228 
More practically, as part of “an effort to harmonize the Code of 
Federal Regulations with other international standards for human clinical 
trials,”229 the WHO issued the Guidelines for Good Clinical Practice (GCP) 
in 1995 with the goal of setting globally applicable standards for trial of 
private pharmaceutical products.230  The GCP adopt the ethical principles 
delineated in the Declaration of Helsinki,231 but further emphasize the 
application of ethics—a priority previous codes lacked.232  Moreover, 
member countries are encouraged to enact national regulations.233  If no 
national regulations exist, countries are encouraged to adopt the GCP.234  In 
fact, the FDA permits the GCP to be a substitute for FDA regulations in 
certain circumstances.235 
                                                                                                                 
 227. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, part III, art. 6(1), Dec. 16, 
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 and 1057 U.N.T.S. 407, entered into force 23 Mar. 1976 [the 
provisions of article 41 (Human Rights Committee) entered into force 28 Mar. 1979], 
available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm#art4 (last visited Apr. 2, 2012) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 228. See Finnuala Kelleher, Note, The Pharmaceutical Industry’s Responsibility for 
Protecting Human Subjects of Clinical Trials in Developing Nations, 38 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. 
PROBS. 67, 73 (2004) (“[W]hile the ICCPR confers absolute rights, it applies only to state 
actors and is not self-enforcing. It established informed consent as a principle of 
international law, but did little more.”). 
 229. Shtilman, supra note 168, at 438. 
 230. See World Health Organization, Guidelines for Good Clinical Practice (GCP) for 
Trials on Pharmaceutical Products introduction (1995), available at 
http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/pdf/whozip13e/whozip13e.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2012) 
(“The purpose of these WHO Guidelines for Good Clinical Practice (GCP) for trials on 
pharmaceutical products is to set globally applicable standards for the conduct of such 
biomedical research on human subjects.”). 
 231. See id. at art. 1.2 (“All research involving human subjects should be conducted in 
accordance with the ethical principles contained in the current version of the Declaration of 
Helsinki.”). 
 232. See Bahir, supra note 207, at 167 (“The WHO guidelines emphasize the 
implementation of the ethical principles, which was lacking in previous guidelines.”). 
 233. See World Health Organization, supra note 230, at art. 1.5 (“Countries in which 
clinical trials are performed should have regulations governing the way in which these 
studies can be conducted.”).  
 234. See id. (“In countries where regulations do not exist or require supplementation, 
relevant government officials may designate, in part or in whole, these Guidelines as the 
basis on which clinical trials will be conducted.”). 
 235. See Investigational New Drug Application, 21 C.F.R. § 312.120 (2010) (stating 
that FDA will accept a “well-designed and well-conducted foreign clinical study not 
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The GCP is fashioned after the Declaration of Helsinki,236 so a 
researcher only “should” seek informed consent.237  Like the Declaration of 
Helsinki and U.S. federal regulations, the GCP suggests a prospective 
independent ethics committee238 that conducts prospective239 and ongoing 
review.240  Still, the GCP protects vulnerable groups241 and enumerates 
information242 that should be provided “in a language and at a level of 
complexity understandable to the subject.”243 
III.  Parallels with the Guatemala Study:  Compliance & Exploitation 
Despite domestic regulations and international ethics created since the 
Guatemala study, U.S. researchers often do not comply with these 
regulations and codes.  The problem is that since the 1990s there has been a 
boom of “international health care research, especially in clinical drug and 
vaccine trials funded by sponsors in wealthy countries and conducted in 
                                                                                                                 
conducted under an IND” if it meets the conditions of GCP and “the FDA is able to validate 
the data from the study through an onsite inspection if the agency deems it necessary”). 
 236. See World Health Organization, supra note 230, at art. 1.2 (1995), available at 
http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/pdf/whozip13e/whozip13e.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2012) 
(“All research involving human subjects should be conducted in accordance with the ethical 
principles contained in the current version of the Declaration of Helsinki.”). 
 237. See id. at art. 3.3 (“The principles of informed consent in the current revisions of 
the Declaration of Helsinki and the International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research 
Involving Human Subjects should be implemented in each clinical trial.”) (emphasis added). 
 238. See id. at art. 3.2 (“The ethics committee should be constituted and operated so 
that its tasks can be executed free from bias and from any influence of those who are 
conducting the trial.”). 
 239. See id. (“Subjects must not be entered into the trial until the relevant ethics 
committee(s) has issued its favourable opinion on the procedures.”). 
 240. See id. (stating the committee “has an ongoing responsibility for the ethical 
conduct of research” so it must be “informed of subsequent amendments to protocol[,] any 
serious adverse events that occur during the trial, or other information likely to affect the 
safety of the subjects or conduct of the trial”). 
 241. See id. at art. 3.3(e), (f) (discussing the necessity of specially protecting children, 
adults who are unable to give consent, “patients with incurable diseases, people in nursing 
homes, prisoners or detainees, the unemployed or people on a very low income, patients in 
emergency departments, some ethnic and racial minority groups, the homeless, nomads and 
refugees”). 
 242. World Health Organization, supra note 230, at art. 3.3(d) (stating subject consent 
is acceptable only if one explains “the aim of the study; the expected benefits for the subjects 
and/or others; the possibility of allocation to a reference treatment or placebo; the risks and 
inconveniences—e.g. invasive procedures; and, where appropriate, an explanation of 
alternative, recognized medical therapy”). 
 243. Id. at art. 3.3(a). 
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developing nations.”244  This boom results in susceptibility for a 
Guatemala-like study recurring because the protections for human subjects 
are not enforced sufficiently.  It is important to recognize parallels between 
the Guatemala study and modern practices in order to understand that 
modern informed consent issues echo ethical issues in the Guatemala study. 
Dubious medical experiments that are similar to the Guatemala study 
and funded by U.S. grants continue to occur both overseas and within the 
United States.245  For example, the United States, via the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention and the National Institutes of Health, has 
funded AIDS research in locations such as Haiti,246  Thailand, the 
Dominican Republic, and several African countries.247  Yet, reports have 
shown that researchers either ignored ethical standards248 or facially 
complied with standards but did not seek actual informed consent.249   In 
fact, the revision of the Declaration of Helsinki in 2000 was due partly to 
the United States’ lack of compliance with its own legal standards.250 
                                                                                                                 
 244. Farrell, supra note 226, at 136; see also Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 
186 n.16 (2d Cir. N.Y. 2009) (“In the United States, for example, the number of foreign 
clinical investigators conducting drug research under an IND increased sixteen-fold in the 
1990s.”) (citations omitted). 
 245. See, e.g., WEYERS, supra note 57, at 594–99 (discussing experiments within the 
United States that occurred during the 1990s that resulted in death to participants due to 
noncompliance with the FDA’s regulations). 
 246. See, e.g., Daniels, supra note 13, at 203–24 (discussing the ethics of a study 
conducted by Cornell University in Haiti that was largely funded by the United States, the 
violations of international law, and the lack of redress for the victims in U.S. courts). 
 247. See, e.g., Jay Dyckman, The Myth of Informed Consent:  An Analysis of the 
Doctrine of Informed Consent and Its (Mis)application in HIV Experiments on Pregnant 
Women in Developing Countries, 9 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 91, 92 (1999) (“Since 1997, the 
Centers for Disease Control (CDC) and the National Institutes of Health (NIH) have paid for 
and conducted experiments on pregnant women infected with HIV in Thailand, the 
Dominican Republic, and several African nations.”). 
 248. See Benjamin M. Meier, International Protection of Persons Undergoing Medical 
Experimentation:  Protecting the Right of Informed Consent, 20 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 513, 
516 (2002) (“Although U.S. government agencies were conducting the testing [at the 
African AZT trials], these experiments took place without regard for U.S. medical research 
standards, which require  . . . that patients be fully informed of all possible treatment options 
and that they receive, at a minimum, the prevailing standard of care.”) (citations omitted). 
 249. See Dyckman, supra note 247, at 94 (discussing “the problematic nature of 
structuring a test regimen on the condition of the freely obtained consent of individuals who 
are not similarly situated to the researchers in terms of power or resources”). 
 250. See ADRIANA PETRYNA, WHEN EXPERIMENTS TRAVEL:  CLINICAL TRIALS AND THE 
GLOBAL SEARCH FOR HUMAN SUBJECTS 33–35 (2009) (stating the debate over the ethics of 
the clinical trials in Africa that used “AZT treatment to halt perinatal transmission of HIV” 
prompted the revision of the Declaration of Helsinki). 
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In addition to research funded by the United States, research 
conducted by American pharmaceutical companies also contains risk of 
noncompliance with ethics.  The opportunity for risk is actually greater 
because the pharmaceutical industry pilots healthcare research that was 
once primarily conducted by the U.S. government.251  This phenomenon is 
due largely to the fact that Americans have become increasingly reluctant to 
participate in drug trials,252 so private companies are “gravitating to 
developing countries because of lower costs, the prevalence of diseases, and 
seemingly limitless numbers of impoverished patients.”253  The lack of 
adequate protections in the context of privately funded research has been 
evident in studies conducted in “broken, impoverished countries” such as 
Russia, India, South Africa as well as other Eastern European, Latin 
American, Asian, and African countries.254 
One recent case, Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc.,255 illustrates problems with 
private companies using vulnerable populations for human subjects;256 its 
circumstances are strikingly similar to those of the Guatemala study in both 
its methods and in its approach to informed consent.  In 1996, Pfizer, one of 
the world’s largest pharmaceutical companies,257 was seeking FDA 
                                                                                                                 
 251. See Christine D. Galbraith, Dying to Know:  A Demand for Genuine Public Access 
to Clinical Trial Results Data, 78 MISS. L.J. 705, 708 (2009) (“The pharmaceutical industry 
now substantially overshadows the federal government as the single greatest source of 
financial support for conducting clinical trials.”) (citing Shankar Vedantam, Drugmakers 
Prefer Silence on Test Data, WASH. POST, July 6, 2004, at A1). 
 252. See Shtilman, supra note 171, at 425 (“Pharmaceutical manufacturers have found 
Americans increasingly hesitant to participate in drug experiments because of skepticism 
about their safety.”) (citing SONIA SHAH, THE BODY HUNTERS:  TESTING NEW DRUGS ON THE 
WORLD’S POOREST PATIENTS 4–5 (2006)). 
 253. Farrell, supra note 226, at 136 (citing Finnuala Kelleher, Note, The 
Pharmaceutical Industry’s Responsibility for Protecting Human Subjects of Clinical Trials 
in Developing Nations, 38 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 67, 67 (2004)). 
 254. See SONIA SHAH, THE BODY HUNTERS:  TESTING NEW DRUGS ON THE WORLD’S 
POOREST PATIENTS 7 (2006) (“The most popular destinations [for drug companies angling for 
FDA approval] are not Western Europe and Japan, but rather the broken, impoverished 
countries of Eastern Europe and Latin America.  Russia, India, South Africa, and other 
Asian and African countries have proven equally fruitful.”) (citations omitted). 
 255. Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 187 (2d Cir. N.Y. 2009) (holding that the 
appellants had “pled facts sufficient to state a cause of action under the ATS for a violation 
of the norm of customary international law prohibiting medical experimentation on human 
subjects without their consent”). 
 256. See Farrell, supra note 226, at 137 (“Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc. illustrates the 
problems that arise when vulnerable populations suffer as a result of their participation in 
clinical research studies.”). 
 257. See id. (stating that Pfizer is “the world’s largest pharmaceutical company”) (citing 
PFIZER INC.: World’s Largest, Research-based, Pharmaceutical Company 
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approval for its antibiotic Trovafloxacin Mesylate, marketed as “Trovan.”258  
In Kano, Nigeria, three American and four Nigerian physicians (in 
conjunction with the Nigerian government) conducted clinical trials with 
children who were patients at Nigeria’s Infectious Disease Hospital.259  
Trovan had never been tested on children in that form and previous animal 
tests had serious side effects.260  The children were given no follow-up care, 
and eleven children died with many others left blind, paralyzed, deaf, or 
brain-damaged.261 
Nigerian children brought suit in U.S. federal courts under the Alien 
Tort Statute (ATS) alleging that Pfizer, working in partnership with the 
Nigerian government, violated a customary international norm that 
prohibited involuntary medical experimentation when it tested Trovan 
without obtaining consent from the children or explaining the risks.262  
Despite FDA regulations, no Institutional Review Board had approved the 
trial.263  Although the district court dismissed the action for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction under the ATS, the Second Circuit decided that the 
district court reached that conclusion incorrectly264 and remanded the case 
                                                                                                                 
Created, BIOTECH WEEK, May 14, 2003, at 94). 
 258. See Abdullahi, 562 F.3d at 169 (stating that the Plaintiff’s alleged that Pfizer 
“sought to gain the approval of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration for the use on 
children of its new antibiotic, Trovafloxacin Mesylate, marketed as ‘Trovan’”). 
 259. See id. at 169 (contending that Pfizer “dispatched three of its American physicians 
to work with four Nigerian doctors to experiment with Trovan on children who were patients 
in Nigeria’s Infectious Disease Hospital in Kano, Nigeria”). “Working in concert with 
Nigerian government officials, the team allegedly recruited two hundred sick children who 
sought treatment  . . . .” Id. 
 260. See id. (“Appellants contend that Pfizer knew that Trovan had never previously 
been tested on children in the form being used and that animal tests showed that Trovan had 
life-threatening side effects, including joint disease, abnormal cartilage growth, liver 
damage, and a degenerative bone condition.”). 
 261. See Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 169 (2d Cir. N.Y. 2009) (“Pfizer 
allegedly concluded the experiment and left without administering follow-up care.”).  
“According to the appellants, the tests caused the deaths of eleven children, five of whom 
had taken Trovan and six of whom had taken the lowered dose of Ceftriaxone, and left many 
others blind, deaf, paralyzed, or brain-damaged.”  Id. 
 262. See id. at 168 (stating the plaintiffs alleged Pfizer “violated a customary 
international law norm prohibiting involuntary medical experimentation on humans when it 
tested an experimental antibiotic on children in Nigeria, including themselves, without their 
consent or knowledge”). 
 263. See id. at 170 (“The appellants allege that, in an effort to rapidly secure FDA 
approval, Pfizer hastily assembled its test protocol at its research headquarters. . . .  
Appellants [also] allege, however, . . . that at the time the letter was purportedly written, the 
IDH had no ethics committee.”). 
 264. See id. at 169 (stating “that the district court incorrectly determined that the 
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because it found that informed consent is a norm of international law.265  
The court stated that “[t]he administration of drug trials without informed 
consent on the scale alleged in the complaints poses a real threat to 
international peace and security.”266 
Abdullahi takes place in recent times, but it illustrates similar problems 
as those present in the Guatemala study.  Both studies experimented on 
vulnerable populations, both contained deficiencies in informed consent 
procedures to develop a new drug as quickly as possible, and both involved 
U.S. and foreign doctors and governments that condoned such actions.  The 
Guatemala study was secret and was never litigated, but the Nigerian 
children (or their families) have the possibility of recourse under the 
ATS.267  It remains to be seen what the final result will be of Abdullahi on 
remand, but if nothing else, it demonstrates a contemporary example of the 
limitations of current informed consent standards and shows the 
applicability of lessons that may be learned from the Guatemala study. 
Another problem with private companies using human subjects in 
developing countries is that these companies view data generated by 
clinical trial as their property, an attitude supported by the FDA and 
courts.268  Consequently, trials that reach publication often reflect only 
positive results, communicating a skewed success rate to the public.269  
Because positive studies are typically the ones published, past studies do 
not inform future studies, so harmful studies may be repeated.270 
                                                                                                                 
prohibition in customary international law against nonconsensual human medical 
experimentation cannot be enforced through the ATS”). 
 265. See Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 169 (2d Cir. N.Y. 2009) (“[T]he 
incorporation of this [informed consent] norm into the laws of this country and this host of 
others is a powerful indication of the international acceptance of this norm as a binding legal 
obligation  . . . .”). 
 266. Id. at 185. 
 267. See supra notes 262–67 and accompanying text (discussing the Second Circuit’s 
recognition that the Nigerian children may have a cause of action under the ATS). 
 268. See Galbraith, supra note 251, at 708 (“[Private pharmaceutical] companies have 
taken the position that if they are funding the research, the data produced should 
consequently be deemed their property, protectable through patent, trade secret, and contract 
law.  Additionally, the FDA has generally supported this view, and the courts by and large 
have similarly agreed.”). 
 269. See id. (“[O]nly a small fraction of trial outcomes are eventually published in 
medical journals or in some other peer-reviewed format.  Moreover, research has shown that 
most of the pieces ultimately published tend to be about trials that demonstrate the treatment 
under investigation was in fact superior  . . . .”).  
 270. See id. (stating that practically, “future studies are generally not informed by 
previous research”). 
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Obviously, repeating harmful trials places human subjects 
unnecessarily at risk.271  The FDA approval process requires human clinical 
trials,272 but Americans are reluctant to participate.273  Consequently, drug 
companies are incentivized to conduct trials overseas.  The problem lies in 
that governments of developing countries frequently choose not to regulate 
clinical trials because they want their citizens to gain access to health care, 
even through risky clinical participation.274  These attitudes about preferring 
health care treatment, even if risky, are disturbingly similar to the 
Guatemalan government’s attitude when it traded cooperation for medical 
surveys and supplies.275 
The lack of consistent Institutional Review Board review, a 
requirement under U.S. law and present in nearly all international 
standards, leads to a greater opportunity for abuses to occur because there is 
no persistent check on ethical practices.276  This problem is exacerbated in 
private pharmaceutical trials because such private actors are not required to 
report clinical trials if they choose not to seek FDA approval.277  Private 
companies, therefore, have greater opportunity to ignore ethical review.278  
Though there are now extensive international guidelines, too many 
overlapping and nonbinding guidelines have created an overly complicated 
system.  During the Guatemala study, legal forces often were not binding.279  
                                                                                                                 
 271. See id. (“[W]hen clinical investigators replicate trials that have previously been 
shown to be ineffective or even harmful, human subjects are placed at considerable risk.”). 
 272. See Shtilman, supra note 168, at 425 (stating the FDA approves new drugs “on the 
basis of their efficacy and safety as determined by the results of time-consuming and 
expensive three-phase human clinical trials”) (citations omitted). 
 273. See id. (“Pharmaceutical manufacturers have found Americans increasingly 
hesitant to participate in drug experiments because of skepticism about their safety.”) (citing 
SONIA SHAH, THE BODY HUNTERS:  TESTING NEW DRUGS ON THE WORLD’S POOREST 
PATIENTS 4–5 (2006)). 
 274. See id. (“[D]espite potential safety risks, government entities in underdeveloped 
nations are often reluctant to regulate their citizens’ participation in experimental drug trials 
because these trials are often perceived as the only method of obtaining otherwise 
unaffordable medical treatment.”). 
 275. See supra note 46 and accompanying text (discussing the Guatemalan 
government’s trade for the use of human subjects). 
 276. See supra notes 184–92 and accompanying text (discussing the role of IRBs). 
 277. See supra note 195 and accompanying text (discussing that a loophole in the 
federal regulations is that a private company may not be regulated if it does not seek FDA 
approval). 
 278. See supra notes 190–205 and accompanying text (explaining loopholes in the 
federal regulations). 
 279. See supra note 65 and accompanying text (discussing that no laws were binding on 
the Guatemala study's researchers in the 1940s). 
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Likewise, current domestic and international regulations present similar 
problems because, though regulations exist, either guidelines are not 
binding or loopholes prevent adequate protection.280 
Clinical studies conducted in developing nations are often the best 
source of available healthcare, so perhaps the failure to seek informed 
consent and IRB review is the lesser of two evils.281  It is true that 
“potentially exploitative clinical research also serves a valuable purpose 
because it develops life-saving and life-improving medications.”282  
Nevertheless, sidestepping ethics by touting the importance of providing 
health care over protections for human subjects reflects the same attitude 
that the Guatemalan government displayed in a study that employed 
extraordinarily invasive and painful procedures.283  The U.S. government 
denounced the Guatemala study as employing practices that should never 
be repeated,284 and these practices included avoidance of ethical 
responsibility.285  Likewise, if the Guatemala study is truly not to be 
repeated, avoidance of ethical obligations should not be tolerated today.  
However, with such loose regulations governing human subject research 
today, can it truly be said that a study similar to the Guatemala study cannot 
recur? 
IV.  Learning from the Guatemala Study:  Improving Informed Consent 
Standards through the Research Participants Protection Modernization Act 
of 2011 
The United States’ current regulatory scheme as well as the inclusion 
of international guidelines has created a complex system that governs 
informed consent standards.  Both U.S. legal standards and international 
guidelines have tried to improve informed consent protections for human 
                                                                                                                 
 280. See supra notes 190–205 and accompanying text (explaining loopholes in the 
federal regulations). 
 281. See Farrell, supra note 226, at 136 (“Moreover, this research [by private 
pharmaceutical companies] may be the best source of health care available to certain 
vulnerable populations.”). 
 282. Id. 
 283. See supra notes 36–59 and accompanying text (discussing the procedures used in 
the Guatemala study). 
 284. See Memorandum supra note 11 and accompanying text (stating President 
Obama’s charge to the Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues). 
 285. See supra notes 123–43 and accompanying text (analyzing how the researchers of 
the Guatemala study avoided ethical responsibility). 
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subjects through devices such as Institutional Review Boards.286  However, 
the enforcement of laws and principles is what actually protects human 
subjects, not the existence of the law or principle. 
The Alien Tort Statute provides an opportunity for human subjects to 
receive redress for violations of informed consent,287 but the ATS does not 
prevent violations of informed consent.  Realistically, human subjects who 
are victims of questionable research practices often do not have the 
financial resources to bring lawsuits in the United States.  Pervasively, the 
problem is that the main enforcer of ethical obligations—IRBs—are 
overworked and “too weak and ineffective” to actually protect human 
subjects.288  Without adequate oversight, the informed consent system and 
other protections for human subjects is a façade for exploitation that creates 
the risk of repeating the Guatemala study.  Even with the ATS, more is 
needed for reasonable protection.  What is needed is U.S. federal legislation 
with some teeth in it. 
There is a piece of legislation that would fortify informed consent 
standards and protect human subjects:  the Research Participants Protection 
Modernization Act of 2011 (RPPMA).  Colorado Representative Diana 
DeGette—who sponsored similar bills in 2002,289 2003,290 2006,291 and 
2009292—introduced RPPMA on July 22, 2011.293  Though Congress has 
not yet enacted the RPPMA into law, Congress should enact it because it 
                                                                                                                 
 286. See Doherty, supra note 150, at 130 (“Mechanisms such as informed consent and 
prospective review by IRBs have evolved to protect human subjects of clinical research.”) 
(citing Alice K. Page, Ethical Issues in International Biomedical Research:  An Overview, 
37 J. HEALTH L. 629, 652–53 (2004)). 
 287. See  Alien Tort Statute,  28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2011) (“The district courts shall have 
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of 
the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”). 
 288. See Saver, supra note 17, at 225 (“Legitimate concerns have been raised about 
IRBs’ increasing workloads, limited resources, insufficient expertise, and lack of 
independence, suggesting that the IRB review system is simply too weak and ineffective to 
protect subjects.”). 
 289. See Human Research Subject Protections Act of 2002, H.R. 4697, 107th Cong. 
(2002).  
 290. See Protection for Participants in Research Act, H.R. 3594, 108th Cong. (2003). 
 291. See The Protection for Participants in Research Act of 2006, H.R. 5578, 109th 
Cong. (2006). 
 292. See Protection for Participants in Research Act of 2009, H.R. 1715, 111th Cong. 
(2009). 
 293. See Research Participants Protection Modernization Act of 2011, H.R. 2625, 112th 
Cong. (2011) (detailing when DeGette introduced the RPPMA to the House of 
Representatives). 
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contains three principles that would improve the current regulatory 
structure.  Firstly, the RPPMA requires review of existing regulations with 
the goal of harmonizing the Common Rule and FDA regulations and 
extending the Common Rule to all research.294  The RPPMA also provides 
financial incentives to IRBs and investigators to comply with federal 
regulations.  And, finally, the RPPMA grants the Department of Health and 
Human Services’ Office for Human Research Protections (OHRP) 
enhanced enforcement authority.295 
The Research Participants Protection Modernization Act of 2011 
intends “[t]o amend the Public Health Service Act with respect to human 
subject research to improve protections for human subjects and, where 
appropriate because of the type of research involved, to reduce regulatory 
burdens.”296  To meet this goal, the RPPMA directs the Secretary of Health 
and Human Services to review and harmonize the Common Rule of the 
Department of Health and Human Services and FDA regulations.297  In 
particular, the Secretary is instructed to determine whether thirteen matters 
should be modified: 
1. How to address potential financial conflicts of interest;298 
2. Whether the list of exemptions from the Common Rule should 
be expanded to include new categories;299 
                                                                                                                 
 294. See id. at § 491(A)(a)(1) (“[A]ll human subject research shall be conducted in 
accordance with the Common Rule, and as applicable to the human subjects involved in 
such research, with the vulnerable-populations rules.”). 
 295. See id. at § 491(B) (discussing increased enforcement abilities of the OHRP). 
 296. See id.  
 297. See id. at § 491A(c)(2)(C)(i) (“The Secretary shall, with respect to the HHS 
Human Subject Regulations, consider the matters specified in clause (iii) and make a 
determination of whether any of the provisions of such Rule or any guidance associated with 
such Rule should be modified accordingly.”); see also Press Release, House Representative 
Diana DeGette, DeGette Introduces Research Participants Protection Act (July 22, 2011), 
available at http://degette.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id 
=1096:degette-introduces-research-participants-protection-act&catid=89:health (last visited 
Apr. 2, 2012) (“The Research Participants Protection Act instructs the Secretary of Health 
and Human Services to review and harmonize federal policy on protecting research 
participants  . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social 
Justice). 
 298. See H.R. 2625, at § 491A(c)(2)(C)(iii)(I) (“How requirements regarding the 
definition and management of potential financial conflict of interest, including both 
investigator and institutional conflicts of interest, should be strengthened and enforced to 
protect human subjects more effectively.”). 
 299. See id. at § 491A(c)(2)(C)(iii)(II) (“Whether the list of exemptions from 
applicability of the HHS Human Subject Regulations  . . . should be expanded to include 
new categories.”). 
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3. “Whether and under what circumstances research that studies 
human tissue or other clinical specimens should not be 
considered a clinical investigation;”300 
4. Whether the list of categories eligible for expedited review 
under the Common Rule should be expanded;301 
5. “Whether institutional review boards include sufficient 
numbers of minority individuals as board members when 
reviewing proposals designed to include human subjects who 
are minority individuals;”302 
6. Whether the number of IRB members who are nonscientific 
members and unaffiliated with the institution should be 
increased;303 
7. “Whether institutional review boards include sufficient 
numbers of individuals with appropriate scientific 
expertise;”304 
8. “How to enhance the protection of people with diminished 
decision-making capacity;”305  
9. How to reduce regulatory burdens for IRBs in multistate 
research while protecting human subjects;306  
10. How to modify “the requirements for managing and reporting 
adverse events and unanticipated problems” both to increase 
consistency between the DHHS and the FDA, and to reduce 
regulatory burden;307 
11. How informed consent requirements should be modified to 
reduce regulatory burdens while protecting human subjects, 
                                                                                                                 
 300. Id. at  § 491A(c)(2)(C)(iii)(III). 
 301. See id. at § 491A(c)(2)(C)(iii)(IV) (“Whether the list of categories of research that 
are eligible for expedited review under the HHS Human Subject Regulations  . . . should be 
expanded to include new categories of research eligible for expedited review.”). 
 302. Id. at  § 491A(c)(2)(C)(iii)(V). 
 303. See Research Participants Protection Modernization Act of 2011, H.R. 2625, 112th 
Cong. § 491A(c)(2)(C)(iii)(VI) (2011) (“Whether the requirements for the number of 
members of an institutional review board who are individuals whose primary expertise is in 
nonscientific areas, and the number of members of an institutional review board who are 
individuals who are not affiliated with the institution served by the board, should be 
increased.”). 
 304. Id. at § 491A(c)(2)(C)(iii)(VII). 
 305. Id. at § 491A(c)(2)(C)(iii)(VIII). 
 306. See id. at § 491A(c)(2)(C)(iii)(IX) (“How the requirements for institutional review 
board review in multisite research should be modified to reduce regulatory burden while 
protecting human subjects, including use of a lead institutional review board.”). 
 307. Id. at § 491A(c)(2)(C)(iii)(X). 
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“including clarification of the circumstances in which 
informed consent does not need to be in writing;”308  
12. How research under FDA regulations should comply with the 
Guidelines for Good Clinical Practice and how to further 
educate investigators in compliance; and309  
13. “Such additional matters as the Secretary determines to be 
appropriate.”310 
Inquiring into and potentially modifying these thirteen areas—
including the catchall of “such additional matters”—means informed 
consent standards will receive scrutiny that is long overdue.  Moreover, the 
Secretary is required to publish determinations in the Federal Register, 
which means that the public would have an opportunity to comment on the 
findings.311  Although the DHHS’ Common Rule and FDA regulations are 
substantially similar,312 inconsistencies exist, and these inconsistencies 
create confusion because there are two sets of rules.  The RPPMA seeks to 
harmonize the two sets of regulations, which would bring about efficiency 
and effectiveness in the law as well as simplify the process for researchers.  
Moreover, if Congress would extend the Common Rule to research 
conducted by private companies, as suggested by RPPMA, it would 
strengthen the protections for human subjects and settle confusion about the 
Common Rule’s applicability to private companies. 
In addition to subjecting these thirteen areas to further scrutiny and 
potentially modifying them, the RPPMA would further benefit informed 
consent standards by amending the rules for IRBs.  Investigators for 
research will be required to notify IRBs of any significant financial interest 
and whether the research has been submitted to another IRB and that IRB’s 
findings.313  Significantly, investigators will also be required to disclose 
                                                                                                                 
 308. See Research Participants Protection Modernization Act of 2011, H.R. 2625, 112th 
Cong. § 491A(c)(2)(C)(iii)(XI) (2011) (“How the requirements for approval and oversight of 
human subjects research that poses no more than minimal risk to participants  . . . should be 
modified to reduce regulatory burden  . . . while protecting research participants, including 
clarification of the circumstances in which informed consent does not need to be writing.”). 
 309. See id. at § 491A(c)(2)(C)(iii)(XII) (“Whether research  . . . should comply with 
the guideline published by the Food and Drug Administration  . . . entitled ‘Good Clinical 
Practice:  Consolidated Guideline,’ and how investigators can be educated effectively 
regarding compliance with this guideline.”). 
 310. Id. at  § 491A(c)(2)(C)(iii)(XIII). 
 311. See id. at § 491A(c)(2)(C)(ii) (“The Secretary shall publish the determination 
required by clause (i) in the Federal Register.”). 
 312. See supra note 179 and accompanying text (stating that the Common Rule and the 
FDA regulations are “virtually identical”).  
 313. See Research Participants Protection Modernization Act of 2011, H.R. 2625, 112th 
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whether they have been “disqualified or restricted by any Federal, State, or 
local entity in their ability to conduct human subject research.”314  These 
disclosures must be submitted when the research is proposed, or as soon as 
the circumstances arise.315  In addition to encouraging transparency, 
requiring these disclosures would aid in eliminating the concern that 
harmful studies are repeated merely because the product is not pursued for 
FDA marketing, thereby solving another current problem with human 
subject research.316  
As for financial incentives, the RPPMA encourages compliance by 
allowing institutions to recover costs from complying with human subject 
protections as direct costs from government sponsors of the research.317  
The RPPMA also addresses the issue of educating IRBs and investigators 
by restricting the Secretary of Health and Human Services from awarding a 
grant, cooperative agreement, or contract for human subject research 
“unless the public entity or private academic institution . . . maintains or 
contracts for a program to educate investigators and board members on the 
protection of human subjects in research.”318  Removing funding for studies 
that do not educate the researchers or IRBs provides a practical reason for 
researchers to focus more on informed consent procedures as well as a 
method to reeducate parties involved in human subject research about the 
importance and goals of informed consent procedures.   
Finally, the RPPMA provides the Office for Human Research 
Protections with more enforcement abilities.  The Director of OHRP would 
have authority to establish criteria for assuring compliance with human 
subject protections; would direct activities at the federal level to protect 
human subjects; would “carry out educational and quality improvement 
programs for human subject protections for principal investigators, 
                                                                                                                 
Cong § 491(A)(d)(1)(A)(i),(iii) (2011) (describing the requirements for an investigator 
submitting research to an IRB). 
 314. Id. at § 491(A)(d)(1)(A)(ii). 
 315. See id. at § 491(A)(d)(1)(B) (“A notification required by subparagraph (A) shall be 
submitted to the institution served by the board—(i) at the time of submitting the proposal 
for human subject research to the board; or (ii) in the case of circumstances arising after such 
submission, immediately.”). 
 316. See supra notes 269–81 and accompanying text (discussing the problems of 
harmful studies repeating). 
 317. See H.R. 2625, at § 491(A)(d)(3) (“Institutions may recover costs associated with 
compliance for human subject protections under this part from government sponsors of 
research as direct costs.”). 
 318. Research Participants Protection Modernization Act of 2011, H.R. 2625, 112th 
Cong. § 491(A)(e) (2011). 
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members of institutional review boards, and other appropriate persons;” 
would advise entities about how to comply with human subject protections; 
would make grants for recruiting and training minority individuals to serve 
on IRBs; and would “consult with experts in biomedical, behavioral, and 
social sciences research.”319  Currently, the Office for Human Research 
Protections calls for the Division of Compliance Oversight (DCO) to 
evaluate noncompliance with DHHS regulations and then the OHRP 
decides what, if any, regulatory action is needed.320  By enacting the 
RPPMA, the FDA and DHHS would continue to include IRBs within their 
regulatory structures, but would be able to increase oversight and 
accountability through the OHRP, because the OHRP would have more 
robust authority to ensure continual compliance with U.S. regulations. 
Interestingly, the same day that the Representative DeGette proposed 
the Research Participants Protection Modernization Act of 2011, the DHHS 
and the FDA issued an announcement of proposed rulemaking that would 
address several of the issues recommended in RPPMA.321  The DHHS’ 
proposal to improve protections for human subjects focuses on seven areas, 
many of which mirror the RPPMA’s goals.  The proposed improvements 
are as follows: 
1. Revising the existing risk-based framework to more accurately 
calibrate the level of review to the level of risk. 
2. Using a single Institutional Review Board review for all 
domestic sites of multi-site studies. 
3. Updating the forms and processes used for informed consent. 
4. Establishing mandatory data security and information 
protection standards for all studies involving identifiable or 
potentially identifiable data. 
                                                                                                                 
 319. Id. at § 491(B)(b) (describing the duties of the Director). 
 320. See Office for Human Research Protection, Compliance Oversight, 
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/compliance/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2012) (“OHRP asks the institution 
involved to investigate the allegations and to provide OHRP with a written report of its 
investigation.  The Office then determines what, if any, regulatory action needs to be taken 
to protect human research subjects.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil 
Rights and Social Justice). 
 321. See Press Release, Department of Health and Human Services Press Office, HHS 
Announces Proposal to Improve Rules Protecting Human Research Subjects,  (Jul. 22, 
2011), http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2011pres/07/20110722a.html (last visited Apr. 2, 
2012) (announcing a proposal to improve rules aimed at enhancing oversight and protecting 
human research subjects) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and 
Social Justice). 
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5. Implementing a systematic approach to the collection and 
analysis of data on unanticipated problems and adverse events 
across all trials to harmonize the complicated array of 
definitions and reporting requirements, and to make the 
collection of data more efficient. 
6. Extending federal regulatory protections to apply to all 
research conducted at U.S. institutions receiving funding from 
the Common Rule agencies. 
7. Providing uniform guidance on federal regulations.322 
 
The goal of the new proposal is to better uphold the ethical principles 
behind the Common Rule, and public comment is being sought until 
October 26, 2011.323  Though the proposed rule is a step in the right 
direction, the rule addresses the 2001 findings of the Presidential 
Commission for Bioethical Issues and is not as comprehensive as the 
Research Participants Protection Modernization Act of 2011.  As a result, 
the RPPMA is still needed to fully address the problems with the U.S. 
informed consent system. 
Rather than relying on the DHHS’ proposed rule alone, Congress 
should adopt the Research Participants Protection Modernization Act of 
2011.  Unlike the bills that Representative DeGette proposed in the past, 
news of the Guatemala study has created more public pressure to change 
modern informed consent laws.  The financial incentives for IBRs as well 
as the goal to streamline federal regulations make the RPPMA an effective 
remedy to problems found in federal informed consent regulations because 
parties involved would better understand how the regulations work and 
have an incentive to follow the regulations.  Moreover, the Office for 
Human Subject Protections’ enhanced enforcement authority would 
centralize federal authority and provide clarity to researchers, many of 
which truly want to comply with informed consent procedures (unlike the 
researchers in the Guatemala study).  The mandatory reporting 
requirements the RPPMA offers in combination with the enhanced 
enforcement authority granted to the Office for Human Subject Protections 
also creates a more transparent system and allows the IRB system to 
become a more effective enforcement mechanism. 
                                                                                                                 
 322. See id. 
 323. See Human Subjects Research Protections:  Changing Protections for Research 
Subjects and Reducing Burden, Delay, and Ambiguity for Investigators, 76 Fed. Reg. 143 
(proposed Jul. 22, 2011) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. Parts 50 and 56) (seeking to establish 
better methods to uphold ethical principles in medical research). 
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V.  Conclusion 
Despite the protections that federal regulations and international 
guidelines impart, improvements are needed.  The goals of current federal 
protections and modern international guidelines should be extended in the 
law to cover all situations involving research with human subjects.  It is 
feasible to do this through adopting the Research Participants Protection 
Modernization Act of 2011 that extends the Common Rule, provides for 
greater enforcement of current protections, and reshapes the IRB oversight 
system into an effective enforcement mechanism. 
The Guatemala study was horrendous, and the legal standards and 
guidelines of its day failed to protect Guatemalans who were infected with 
syphilis.  Similar studies are being conducted by U.S. researchers in 
developing nations around the world, whether through grants from the U.S. 
government or by private U.S. companies.  These problems must be 
remedied, and the Research Participants Protection Modernization Act of 
2011 provides the impetus for the U.S. to do so.  As Amy Gutmann, Chair 
of the Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues stated, “a 
civilization can be judged by the way that it treats its most vulnerable 
individuals.  There is no position of vulnerability that is greater than to be 
the subject of a medical experiment.”324 
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